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ROLE OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM IN POST ACQUISITION 
SUCCESS: A RESOURCE-BASED VIEW
ABSTRACT
The acquisition strategy is likely the most popular corporate strategy for 
growth.   Research continues to explore this strategy and suggest that acquisitions occur 
for numerous reasons: rapid renewal in a global marketplace, creating synergies, ensuring 
financial and tax advantages, establishing market power, and the market for corporate 
control.  However, a large body of research suggests that top management team (TMT) 
failure and improvement in efficiency is the key role for acquisitions, as argued in the 
market for corporate control literature.  An important research question that researchers 
continue to explore is the disposition of the TMT subsequent to acquisition and its impact 
on acquisition performance.
This research focuses on the TMT, their retention, the particular characteristics of 
the TMT (their networks, knowledge, dynamic capability), these characteristics 
moderated by both acquisition type and competitive environment, and their value to the 
acquiring firm to help explain the variation in post acquisition success of the acquired 
firm.  Finally, this research focuses on smaller acquisitions, which are the majority as 
opposed to most previous research that focused on larger acquisitions only. This research 
also examines primary data from acquisition managers as opposed to the secondary 
(archival) data that has dominated most previous work on acquisitions.  
Our findings suggest that Pre-Acquisition performance of the target firm 
correlates with top management team (TMT) retention.  Higher TMT retention was found 
to positively correlate with Post-Acquisition performance and that Pre-Acquisition 
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performance does not correlate with post-acquisition performance.  TMT knowledge, 
TMT network and TMT dynamic capability were found to be positively significant to 
post-acquisition performance.  We controlled for the size of the acquirer versus the 
acquired, how the firm was purchased and the type of ownership of the acquired firm.
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Chapter One
Statement of the Problem and Contribution
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Rationale and Importance of Research
1.3  Research Questions:
1.4  Structure of this dissertation:
1.1 Introduction
  Acquisition strategy research is extensive and ongoing.  The sheer volume of 
acquisitions suggests that this strategy is likely the most popular approach for growth by 
corporations (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). For example in 2003, 27,612 Mergers and 
Acquisitions deals worth $1.33 trillion were announced, which is a 10% growth from 
2002 which had 26,270 deals worth $1.21 trillion (Wall Street Journal, 2004).  However, 
past research has suggested that acquisitions do not create shareholder value (Datta and 
Puia, 1995).  The popularity of the strategy in spite of its apparent lack of success 
(measured mostly through stockholder value) creates a rich research opportunity.  
Research has suggested that one reason firms pursue the acquisition strategy is 
due to the change in the marketplace where speed becomes of the essence and the need 
for rapid renewal plays a significant role in driving organizations to acquire competences 
rather than to build them internally (Hayward, 2002; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; 
Hamel, 2000).  The finance and economics literatures conceptualize acquisitions as 
natural forces in a market for corporate control where alternative management teams 
compete for the right to control the assets of undervalued corporations (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983).  The market for corporate control is defined as the transferring of 
managerial control to new capital providers (e.g., through acquisitions), i.e. the market 
for buying and selling businesses (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1996).  Firms 
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also complete acquisitions for other strategic objectives such as creating synergies, 
ensuring financial and tax advantages, and establishing market power (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).
Although there are many reasons for acquisitions, much of the research suggests 
that TMT failure and improvement in efficiency are the key motivators for acquisition 
(Herman and Lowenstein, 1988; Walsh and Koznick, 1993).  For example, the key role of 
takeovers is seen as controlling the behavior of corporate managers who have pursued 
courses that have caused the firm to under-perform (Jensen, 1986).  Mergers are also seen 
as improving efficiency after managers who may have been poor agents for their 
stockholders (Council of Economic Advisers, 1985).  There is little direct evidence for 
the efficiency-enhancing disciplinary view, but researchers have drawn support for this 
view by eliminating alternative motives (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).  This literature 
suggests that getting rid of the previous management should improve the performance of 
the acquired firm.  However some recent research suggests that there may be no 
association between acquired firm TMT stewardship and acquisition performance.  
Specifically, Walsh and Elwood (1991) found no association between TMT turnover and 
pre-acquisition performance.  Walsh and Koznick (1993) found no relationship between 
corporate raider takeover and TMT turnover while Martin and McConnell (1991) even 
found a negative association with TMT turnover post-acquisition performance. 
The key question becomes what is the effect of the target firm’s top management 
team (TMT) on performance of the target firm subsequent to acquisition.  The research is 
typically explored through use of secondary data by examining the substantial increase of 
executives leaving the firm and through a sample of very large acquisitions (e.g., Morck, 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Martin and McConnell, 1991; Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 
1993; Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Kennedy and 
Limmack, 1996).  Often these views suggest that the target firm’s TMT may not be 
retained as the research results chronicle increased post-acquisition turnover rates among 
target firms’ top managers (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991).  
This dissertation research is different in several critical areas:  This research 
explores acquisitions and the value of the TMT from a viewpoint that combines the 
Upper Echelon perspective of top management teams with a resource based view of them
(e.g. Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993).  We explore this perspective 
arguing that the TMT is valuable, needs to be retained after acquisition, and positively 
affects post-acquisition performance.  The Upper Echelon perspective suggests that there 
is a linkage between top management characteristics and the development of strategic 
assets so that the organization becomes a reflection of the TMT.  The development of this 
“reflection” assists in explaining the competitive behavior of the firm.  The resource 
based view argues that organizations accumulate and develop a bundle of specialized 
resources that are both tangible and intangible.  These resources, when applied 
appropriately, should generate above average returns and can create a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993).  The resource 
based view offers that physical, human, and organizational resources are an 
organization’s source of competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, non-
substitutable and inimitable (Barney, 1991).  The top management team (TMT) has 
control over all organizational resources, to one degree or another and may be the 
valuable resource that attracts acquisition attempts.  From this perspective firms will 
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acquire other firms that have these valuable resources to augment their own stock to 
compete effectively in the new global marketplace.  
This dissertation also examines the specific characteristics of the TMT in post 
acquisition success through their networks, knowledge, and dynamic capabilities to post 
acquisition performance of the acquired firm.  The focus of analysis for this study is the 
post acquisition performance of the acquired entity, not the overall combined firm to be 
consistent with some other TMT research (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). This 
dissertation examines which characteristics of the TMT are seen as important in 
acquisitions moderated by both industry specific competitive environment and type of 
acquisition.   Finally, we explore and extend the TMT as a resource in regard to 
acquisitions through a field study using primary data as opposed to the archival data most 
commonly used. We will examine the purchase of smaller firms (which compose the 
majority of acquisitions), as opposed to larger acquisitions (that while fewest in number 
have dominated the prior research).    
1.2  Rationale and Importance of Research
Research has suggested that the top management team of an acquired organization 
tends to leave the organization after acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Walsh 
and Kosnick, 1993).  U.S. target organizations can expect to lose about two-thirds of the 
executives of the acquired organization within 5 years of acquisition (Krug and Hegarty, 
1997). This issue is even more prominent at the international level where departures are 
even higher when the purchaser is a foreign multinational (Krug and Hegarty, 1997).  
Explanations for the loss of the target’s TMT vary from differences in corporate culture, 
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loss of autonomy, incompatible governance imposition, and the preferred explanation 
from the economic-finance literature, that of the market for corporate control.
The market for corporate control literature suggests that when the TMT of the 
acquired firm exits the situation, it is due to their underperformance and the market is 
working, as the new TMT of the acquirer has successfully rid them-selves of the poorer 
performing TMT (Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Martin and McConnell, 1991; Kennedy 
and Limmack, 1996).  The synergy literature would suggest that due to economies of 
scale and scope, a target firm’s TMT’s departure would eliminate costs thus providing 
greater return for shareholders (Chatterjee et al, 1992; Amit and Livnat, 1988).  
This dissertation investigates the view that argues that firms do not predominantly 
acquire failing or poorly performing firms. Rather this dissertation proposes that firms 
make acquisitions of successful firms to add to their own resource base and that the 
intention of the acquisition is to retain a valuable TMT.  This research focuses on the 
TMT retention and their value to the firm to help explain the variation in acquisition 
performance.  The sample is also  different from previous studies that typically examine 
large firms (e.g., Hambrick and Cannella (1993) examined only the largest 108 
acquisitions in a five year time span) and focus on the majority of acquisitions, which are 
smaller.  We also examine the particular characteristics of the TMT moderated by both 
acquisition type and competitive environment to post-acquisition performance.
1.3 Research Questions:
Research Question One:  The first research question is a fundamental question in 
the field  of strategic management:  Is there a relationship between the retention of the 
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TMT of the target firm after acquisition and post-acquisition performance of the acquired 
firm?  There is an emphasis in strategic management currently on the Resource-based 
view of the firm and which resources are actually rare, inimitable, valuable and organized 
to exploit their value, therefore the identification of resources that fulfill these criteria 
facilitate theory development.  If these resources (the TMT) are lost, what is the effect to 
post-acquisition performance?  Not only are we interested in the relationship between 
retention and post-acquisition performance, but also the relationship if the resources are 
not retained.
By addressing the question of the relationship between post-acquisition 
performance and retention of the TMT, this dissertation attempts to account for the 
change in business practices and global “speed” in which inimitability and scarce 
management capabilities are now prevalent.  This dissertation results suggest that the 
TMT retention positively correlates to post-acquisition performance, thus contradicting 
the agency theory perspective of self-interested managers that are supplanted by a new 
managerial team.  In essence, the TMT is a valuable resource that is an integral part of 
the target firm’s value.
Research Question Two:  The second research question examines whether there is 
a relationship between target firm pre-acquisition performance and the retention of the 
TMT.  The argument offered by the market for corporate control for acquisitions is that 
the target is performing poorly due to an inadequate management, thus the marketplace 
sees an opportunity.  The argument continues that the poorly performing firm is bought 
and the target TMT is then fired.  This argument does not address the purchase of non-
poorly performing firms, but we attempt to measure both poorly performing firms, and 
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those with good performance.  In essence the question is:  Does pre-acquisition
performance of the firm affect the retention of the TMT?
By addressing the above questions, this dissertation goes beyond the relation 
between post-acquisition performance and TMT retention, but also pre-acquisition
performance and whether the TMT is retained.  Intuitively and in accordance with our 
findings, the results suggest that Pre-Acquisition performance of the target correlates with
top management team (TMT) retention. Interestingly, barely a third of our sample 
indicated that the firm was performing below average and very few with poor
performance, thus adding to the strategy literature the concept that firms may actually be 
purchasing firms that are performing well, but both are seeking complementary
resources.  This indicator continues to support the resource based view that resources that 
are rare, valuable, organized, and inimitable are a source of competitive advantage and 
may not be internally replicated by a competitor, but can be done through acquisition.
Research Question Three: Are the TMT characteristics we have theoretically 
identified (network, knowledge, dynamic capability) correlate to post-acquisition
performance of the acquired firm? The Upper Echelon perspective suggests that there is 
a linkage between top management characteristics and the development of strategic assets 
so that the organization becomes a reflection of the TMT.  The development of this 
“reflection” assists in explaining the competitive behavior of the firm (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984).  Yet this general concept conceals the elements of the TMT that are in 
particular valuable to an organization.  
One of the characteristics important to a TMT is the network of relationships in 
which the TMT is embedded in, both external and internal.  For example, the advice 
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network that a TMT forms to acquire and share tacit knowledge throughout the 
organization is a key coordinating mechanism (Athanssiou and Nigh, 1999).  Also, the 
internal network focuses on productivity, innovation, and labor relations, while the 
external network will focus on competition, customers and new product/market 
opportunities (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). TMTs develop networks of relationships 
between firms and then maintain them.  These relationships developed are an integral part 
of a firm’s success, and are often inimitable.  The significant findings in this dissertation 
suggest that the network of relationships developed by the TMT is a characteristic that 
purchasing firms find a valuable component of the acquisition and the TMT in specific.
Today’s marketplace is becoming more knowledge-based so knowledge and the 
competencies built upon a knowledge platform are key factors in determining an 
organization’s current and future value (Grant, 1996; Hamel, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 
1993; Spender, 1996; Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001; Seth, Song and Petit, 2002; 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). The TMT has tacit knowledge in regard to strategy, 
organizational strengths and weakness, the industry, etc., which is a valuable commodity 
to the firm.  Also, the TMT develops routines that create knowledge flows throughout the 
organization.  Knowledge is information laden with experience, truth, judgment, 
intuition, and values; a unique combination that allows individuals and organizations to 
assess new situations and manage change (Huseman and Goodman, 1999).  This 
dissertation findings support the knowledge-based perspective, that the TMT knowledge 
is a valuable characteristic and thus an integral component of the target acquisition value.
One of the new strategic challenges in today’s marketplace and a possible form of 
competitive advantage is “speed” (Pearce, 2002).  How the TMT employs the firm’s 
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assets, and how quickly, affects the success of a strategy in today’s global competition 
(Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998b).  This asset employment can be called dynamic 
capabilities, which refer to the development of management capabilities and difficult-to-
imitate combinations of organizational, functional and technological skills to gain/sustain 
a competitive advantage (Teece, et al., 1997).  Our results in this dissertation support this 
assertion and the TMT characteristic of dynamic capabilities has become a credible asset 
in today’s global marketplace.  In essence, the three TMT characteristics are a beginning 
to unravel the particulars or value of the TMT in regard as a valuable resource to the firm.
1.4 Structure of this dissertation:
The remainder of this dissertation is in the following format.  Chapter Two (The 
Literature Review) discusses the strategic importance of acquisition, acquisition types, 
theories we are applying to our research, and an overview of the literature on 
acquisitions.  Chapter Three (Theoretical Model and Hypothesis Development) discusses 
all the constructs and develops a model with variables of Top Management Team: 
Retention, Pre-acquisition Performance, Post-Acquisition Performance, TMT 
Characteristics (TMT Network, TMT Knowledge, TMT Dynamic Capabilities), 
Competitive Environment, and Type of Acquisition.  Chapter 4 (Methodology) describes 
the dependent and independent variables, and discusses the sample and how we collected 
the data.  Chapter Five (Results) presents the results of our research.  Chapter 6 discusses 
the theoretical implications, managerial implications, future research, limitations of the 




2.0  Overview of the literature review
2.1  Acquisitions: Background and Strategic Importance
2.2  Acquisition Types
2.3  Upper Echelon Theory and the Resource 
Based View to TMT/Acquisitions
2.4  Upper Echelon Theory
2.5  Dynamic Capabilities Perspective
2.6  Knowledge based Perspective
2.7  Summary
2.0  Overview
This section discusses acquisitions and the theoretical reasons for firms to acquire 
other firms.  We also explore the literature in regard to the evidence that suggests that the 
acquisition strategy may not be successful.  The different types of acquisitions are 
explored and then the recent literature in regard to the resource based view is applied to 
acquisitions.  Upper echelon theory in concert with the resource based view is applied to 
the TMT and their value to acquisitions.  The dynamic capabilities perspective and the 
knowledge based view are introduced to assist in explaining the importance of the TMT 
in acquisition success.  I end the section with a summary of the research in regard to 
acquisitions.
2.1 Acquisitions: Background and Strategic Importance
Researchers have investigated the logic behind the acquisition/ownership decision 
using multiple theories.  The rationale from Transaction Cost Economics for acquisition 
rests with minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).  
The resource based view (Wernerfelt, 1984) suggests that through acquisition an 
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organization can maximize value by gaining access to the idiosyncratic and valuable 
resources of other organizations (Madhok, 1997; Ramanathan, et. al., 1997).  Coff (1999) 
suggests that firms will attempt to purchase other firms for their knowledge, but will 
utilize different coping strategies in reaction to the knowledge intensity of the industry 
and their relatedness.  Lubatkin (1987) found no differences in returns to bidding firm’s 
shareholders for strategically related and unrelated firms.  Barney (1988) suggests that 
synergistic cash flows stemming from relatedness will lead to abnormal returns for the 
acquiring firm’s shareholders when those cash flows are private and unique, inimitable 
and unique, or unexpected.  One important source of value in acquisitions is the potential 
to transfer valuable intangible assets such as know-how between the combining 
organizations (Caves, 1982).  The knowledge based perspective continuously turns to 
privately held knowledge as a basic source of competitive advantage of which attracts 
acquisition attempts.
Strategic reasons for employing an acquisition strategy include: access to new 
markets, the availability of scarce specialized resources, the opportunity to achieve 
production efficiencies, and/or the means to reducing political or market risk (Cooke, 
1988).  For example, an international acquisition strategy allows organizations to exploit 
foreign market opportunities quicker than other strategies (Root, 1987), overcome trade 
and investment barriers (Mergers and Acquisitions, 1990), and, through international 
market diversification, stabilizing organization returns due to uncorrelated market 
fluctuations and turbulent political climates (Caves, 1982).
Although acquisition strategies continue to be attractive, organizations divest a 
high proportion of unrelated and related acquisitions (unrelated as a higher percentage) 
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often shortly after their purchase (Bergh, 1997).  The percentage of unrelated acquisitions 
alone that are divested ultimately can reach as high as 79% (Porter, 1987).  In the past, 
researchers have connected failure of the acquisition to divestiture (Porter, 1987; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) and that divestitures occur when the acquisition does not 
meet the expectations that prevailed at the time of acquisition strategy execution (Bergh, 
1997). Divestiture may lead to financial losses, damage to the reputation of the 
purchasing organization, dismissal of executives, and devaluation by the financial 
community (Donaldson, 1990; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992).
Contrary to previous studies, recent literature suggests that acquisitions do not fail 
as often as thought and can create value for the organization.  For example cross-border 
acquisitions represent an increase of 7.5 –10.7 percent in value for 74-76% of the 
organizations that use this strategy (Eun, Koldny and Schereaga, 1996; Seth, Song and 
Pettit, 2000; Bradley, et. al., 1988; Seth, 1990a; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1996).  In 
domestic acquisitions, research has suggested that additional value has been derived from 
an increase in operational efficiency, an increase in market power, or some other form of 
financial gain (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Seth, 1990b)
Also, most prior studies utilized financial measures that only include acquisitions 
whose impact must be measurable on combined organizations’ performance (e.g., stock 
price, corporate financial statements).  For example Business Week (2002) suggests that 
acquisitions fail to generate stockholder value, yet includes in its analysis only those 
acquisitions valued at greater than $500 million.  This type of acquisition is a minority 
(10-12%) to the total number of acquisitions performed (Ernst and Young, 2003), as the 
average acquisition’s dollar value is $64 million (Business Week, 2002).  
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2.2 Acquisition Types
Acquisitions have been classified according to the following four types: Vertical, 
horizontal, conglomerate and concentric (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992).  The 
characteristics of each type of acquisition vary markedly in regard to the strategy behind 
them, the value of and type of resources to be acquired, and the role of the extant TMT.  
We describe each of the four acquisition types below.
In a vertical acquisition, one organization is acquiring another within their supply 
chain (e.g., a manufacturer purchasing an organization backward in their chain; e.g., a 
supplier, or forward in their supply chain; e.g., a distributor or a customer).  Transaction 
cost analysis would suggest that this type of acquisition occurs to internalize or lower the 
costs of production or of doing business in the open market.  In a horizontal acquisition, 
two organizations in the same industry (competitors) combine operations.  This type of 
acquisition occurs for economies of scale, market power, or the acquisition of 
competencies from the competitor.  A conglomerate acquisition is the acquisition of an 
unrelated organization.  This practice was more common in the 1960’s (Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1993) and the objectives were to reduce systematic risk between industries and
to develop a large internal capital market.   Concentric acquisition refers to a combination 
between organizations offering complimentary products or services.  An example of such 
would be a wireless service organization being acquired by an organization with core 
competencies in local and long distance services.  Potential economies of scale, use of 
similar distribution channels, and sales capabilities could overlap.  Although the four 
types are differentiated, often the classification for a given acquisition is not so 
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straightforward and may have characteristics of each, especially in the case of horizontal 
and concentric acquisitions.  
The definitions of the acquisition types discuss broader structural and external 
relationships and do not discuss the internal manifestations that often lead to subsequent 
success or failure of the acquisition goals (i.e., changes in corporate culture, resource 
allocations, TMTs, synergy development, etc.).  As the resource-based view holds that an 
organization is viewed as a bundle of specialized resources that are deployed to create a 
privileged market position, how these resources are organized, employed and 
subsequently integrated by the top managers is of interest (Barney; 1986; 1988; Dietrix, 
Cool and Barney, 1989; Rumelt, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; 1995).  Firms are also a 
reflection of their top management teams and organizational outcomes can be predicted 
through an examination of these individuals (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  This 
argument follows earlier work that suggests that top managers are unique as they are 
often unable to make economically rational decisions because they are boundedly rational 
and must act in a social context of multiple and conflicting goals (March and Simon, 
1958; Cyert and March, 1963).  Therefore the TMTs of firms are responsible for their 
firm’s success or failure due to their strategic decisions, corporate culture development, 
human resource selection and enhancement, knowledge that is internal to the firm as well 
as their external knowledge of the industry, market, and competitors.
2.3  Upper Echelon Theory and the Resource Based View to TMT/Acquisitions
This section presents a view of the TMT, their capabilities, and their role in 
acquisition success using Upper Echelon Theory as the core of the argument.  This 
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perspective then integrates the Upper Echelon perspective with the RBV because the 
Upper Echelon perspective argues that top managers are valuable to their firms and the 
RBV explains why.  We further augment the Upper Echelon perspective by integrating 
the dynamics capabilities perspective The TMT’s value from the dynamic capabilities 
perspective suggests that the TMT’s strategic decisions in tangible/intangible asset 
utilization, combination, acquisition, and disposal create value for the firm.  
This section will examine the importance of the TMT through research in Upper 
Echelon theory and the resource based view paying particular attention to the dynamic 
capabilities and knowledge based elements of the RBV.  Upper Echelon theory allows us 
to develop a linkage between top management characteristics and the development of 
strategic assets.  This concept puts the focus on TMT behavior rather than a single 
individual such as the CEO (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Hambrick and Mason’s 
research suggests that the organization becomes a reflection of the TMT, which in turn 
helps explain the competitive behavior of the firm.   
2.4  Upper Echelon Theory
The most important group in an organization is the top management team (e.g. 
Ireland and Hitt, 1999).  The TMT of an organization ranges from as little as three to ten 
people and is at the apex of the organization providing strategic leadership (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996).  Successful firms owe their success to these small groups of 
executives that develop strategy and direct the resources that combine both the firm’s 
tangible and intangible assets. Researchers have explored the link between human 
resource planning and strategic planning, as the TMT is the focal force in planning 
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strategy and staffing to strategic requirements (Walker, 1978; Devanna, Fombrum and 
Tichy, 1984; Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Wright and Snell, 1991).  The resource based 
view has shifted the emphasis from external factors in the strategy literature to internal 
factors (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and Yiu, 1999) thus bringing legitimacy to the importance 
of people to organization success.  Human resources could be a source of competitive 
advantage, especially if they are aligned with the organization’s competitive advantage 
(Huselid, 1995). Organizations, in a broader sense, have developed certain rules and 
processes that determine who holds the power and how it is executed.  These rules and 
processes are developed through mutual agreement amongst the participants (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).  A boundedly rational TMT 
affects a firm’s strategic choice and the subsequent performance of the firm due to these 
decisions (Cyert and March, 1963).
Prior research concerning the role of the TMT in post acquisition success, 
however presents a mixed picture.  As an example, some of the succession literature 
implies that loss of the TMT and subsequent succession by new managers has no effect 
on the subsequent firm’s acquisition performance (Romanelli and Tushman, 1987; 
Virany, Tushman and Romanelli, 1992).  The succession literature focuses on the effects 
of CEO succession and their relationship with the TMT, as interest conflicts and 
competition between the CEO and other senior executives put the CEO at risk of power 
contests with senior executives (Ocasio, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002). However, 
Grusky, (1969) plus Helmich and Brown, (1972) suggest that insider/outsider successions 
affect the firm differently.  Also, research has suggested that new top managers with prior 
records of good performance are more likely to bring about performance improvements, 
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which supports the market for corporate control arguments (Smith, Carson and 
Alexander, 1984; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1986).  One key exception in this area of 
research is Cannella and Hambrick (1993).   These authors found that that the loss of the 
TMT from the acquired firms negatively affected post acquisition performance of the 
acquired firm.  
TMT departure after acquisition may heighten the level of disruption and 
uncertainty in the firm following acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick 
and Cannella, 1993; Krishnan, et. al., 1997; Singh and Zollo, 1998).  Past research has 
suggested that management retention should be more important in unrelated acquisitions 
than in related ones, since the target firms’ TMT are likely to be more familiar with their 
operation then the acquiring firm (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Walsh, 1988).  Yet, 
from a resource based perspective, the TMT may be as important whether the acquisition 
is related or unrelated.  The organization’s culture, strategy, and dynamics are all 
dependant upon the TMT (Cyert and March, 1963; Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977).  
Development of the organization’s culture, strategy and dynamic capability by the 
TMT are performed with the objective of building the economic value of the firm.  These 
processes occur through the integration of complementary human resources and 
development of a synergistic environment (Seth, et. al., 2002; 2000; Eun, et. al., 1996).  
The TMT, through their guidance, corporate culture development, employment practices, 
and deployment of human resources influence these internal factors.  Decisions by the 
TMT to align the human resource skills and strategy can affect performance (Wright, 
Mcmahan and Smart, 1995).  Also, the TMT through their strategic choices is a main 
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component that determines the success or failure of an organization (Andrews, 1971; 
Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972; Priem, 1994).  Strategic leadership theory holds that 
companies are reflections of their top managers and that the specific knowledge, 
experience, values and preferences of top managers are reflected not only in their 
decisions, but also in their assessment of decision situations (Cannella and Monroe, 
1997).  
2.5  Dynamic Capabilities Perspective
The dynamic capabilities perspective suggests further value of the TMT (Madhok & 
Osegowitsch, 2000).  Dynamic capabilities refer to the development of both management 
capabilities, and difficult-to-imitate combinations of organizational, functional 
technological skills to gain/sustain a competitive advantage as well as the ability to 
change these things as the need arises (Teece, et al., 1997). The TMT has a major role in 
this process.  Dynamic capabilities necessitate having the TMT develop overall 
organizational coherence. Such coherence must recognize the unique features of the 
internal and external environment to facilitate customization of strategies while focusing 
attention on the adaptation, integration plus the reconfiguring of both internal and 
relational resources to match the opportunities in the global and local marketplaces 
(Dierickx, Cool and Barney, 1989; Teece et al., 1997).
Dynamic capabilities theory is derived from the resource-based view of the firm 
that focuses on firm-level resources (internal factors semi-permanently linked to the 
organization) that provide the firm with a unique competitive posture (Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx, Cool and Barney, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984).  Briefly, the resource-based view of 
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the firm theorizes that the accumulation of resources, that are: 1) valuable; 2) rare; 3) 
imperfectly imitable; and 4) for which there are not strategically equivalent substitutes 
create resource position barriers to deter competition, and competitive advantage 
resulting in above-normal returns (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Alternatively, the dynamic capabilities perspective argues that capabilities are more 
substitutable across different contexts as well as equifinal, thus rendering inimitability 
and immobility irrelevant to sustained competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). As such, the dynamic capabilities perspective is focused on the strategic 
employment of key resources, as opposed to the ownership of the resources themselves 
and application in a stable environment.  The TMT’s decisions as to the direction and 
employment of strategically key resources are often what create value for firms.  
Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines, by which firms 
achieve new resource reconfigurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  The firm’s internal resources are not considered stable, 
but must be bought, sold and developed by the TMT as the strategy changes to compete 
in the dynamic environment.
2.6 Knowledge based Perspective
Both the resource based view and dynamic capabilities perspectives would 
suggest that knowledge is critical.  Increasing turbulence in the market place has 
suggested that knowledge; tacit knowledge in particular, is the most strategically 
important resource which firms possess (Quinn, 1992).  Tacit knowledge is both difficult 
to transfer and necessitates transaction-specific investment.  The primary task of the TMT 
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is to integrate the specialized knowledge of multiple individuals within the firm (Grant, 
1996).  The critical source of competitive advantage is knowledge integration throughout 
the firm and not the knowledge itself.  Therefore a knowledge based theory is the 
perception of interdependence as an element of organizational design and subject to 
managerial choice.  The quality of the choices of the TMT rest upon their relevant 
expertise developed over time.
The concept of the role of knowledge and the accumulation of knowledge within 
the capitalist society as paramount in value generation is not new, as the Austrian school 
of economics in the 19th century advocated such an idea.  Social institutions and firms 
should be appraised by reference to their ability to generate and transmit knowledge 
(Bohm-Bawerk, 1959; Hayek, 1935). On this account, markets are conceived of as 
institutions geared to the production and distribution of socially valuable knowledge 
(Bohm-Bawerk, 1959; Hayek, 1935).  
The current knowledge marketplace is a new economy characterized by new 
technologies, globalization and an ever increasing emphasis on intangibles (Sullivan, 
2000; Neef, 1999; Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999; Thurow, 1996).  Strategy scholars, business 
“gurus”, pundits and management researchers suggest that today’s marketplace is 
knowledge-based and that knowledge and the competencies built upon this platform 
could be the main factor in determining a organization’s current and future value 
(Drucker, 1993; Thurow, 1999; Grant, 1996; Hamel, 2000).  Capital, natural resources 
and labor are not the most valuable resources in today’s economy; instead knowledge and 
knowledge workers play the central role (Drucker, 1993).  Knowledge has emerged as the 
most strategically significant resource of the organization as increasing turbulence of the 
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external business environment has focused attention upon resources and organizational 
capabilities (Grant, 1996; Quinn, 1992).
A knowledge-based argument is another foundation of the resource based view 
and an emerging theme in the strategic management literature that continuously turns to 
privately held knowledge as a basic source of competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; 
Barney, 1991; Winter, 1995). The resource based view addresses performance
differences between organizations by using asymmetries in knowledge as a foundation 
for the argument (e.g. Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 
1991; Chen, 1996; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Peteraf, 1993; Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Schoemaker and Amit, 1994; Winter, 1995).
Significant attention in the strategy literature under the auspices of the resource 
based view has focused on knowledge, specifically knowledge in regard to customers, 
competitors, or to the creation of new products or services (ex. Hansen, 1999; Hedlund, 
1994; Nonaka, 1991; Sveiby, 1998; Szulanski, 1996; Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996).  
The human resource management field focuses more on job related knowledge and 
although it has been argued that all learning begins at the individual (Argyris, 1976) it is 
affected by both the social context and routines within an organization (Nonaka,
Takeuchi and Umemento, 1996).  Thus the TMT effectively influences the organizational 
culture to either engender or hinder knowledge development, assimilation, and 
intraorganizational transfer (Zahra and George, 2002).
Snell, Youndt and Wright, (1996) argue that core competencies of an organization 
are knowledge based and are comprised of human capital, social capital (ex. 
internal/external relationships and exchanges) plus organizational capital. The TMT’s 
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internal and external relationships with employees, customers, competitors, suppliers, etc. 
and the exchange of ideas, knowledge and effective direction are sources of the core 
competency.  The dynamic management of this human capital and the TMT’s internal 
and external relationships becomes a resource in itself.
Knowledge is information laden with experience, truth, judgment, intuition, and 
values; a unique combination that allows individuals and organizations to assess new 
situations and manage change (Huseman and Goodman, 1999).  Differences in the 
knowledge possessed by different individuals are implicit in the concept of asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1985).  More broadly, these differences motivate individuals to 
specialize in various aspects of business activity, including the TMT (Connor and 
Prahalad, 1996).  
As discussed above, many scholars consider knowledge as a valuable resource to 
the organization and may be a requirement to compete in today’s marketplace.  The TMT 
is important to this collection and dissemination of knowledge.  Often the TMT 
knowledge is tacit and its value is due to its inimitability.  Also, the TMT generates a 
culture of knowledge creation and dissemination within the organization through 
corporate culture development.  In essence, the TMT, from a knowledge based 
perspective, can be a source of competitive advantage.
The resource based view of the firm of the organization suggests that 
organizations accumulate and develop a bundle of specialized resources that are both 
tangible and intangible.  These resources, when applied appropriately, will generate 
above average returns and can create a sustainable competitive advantage.  However, 
resource based view’s assumption of the organization as a bundle of resources breaks
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down in high velocity markets because in these situations resources are added, 
recombined and dropped with regularity.  The dynamic capabilities theory focuses on the 
flexibility of integration in the new dynamic marketplace with the focus on knowledge 
transfer and integration and due to the global pressures; nearly all industries are affected 
and require this aptitude.  These capabilities are concerned not only with product and 
process innovations, but also with strategic innovations that reconfigure knowledge into 
new approaches to competing.  
Knowledge based theory, suggests that the TMT may create firm value.  Their 
personal knowledge and development of knowledge integration throughout the 
organization creates this specific firm value.  In particular, the dynamic capabilities 
perspective supports the value of the TMT.  As the marketplace continues to become 
even more dynamic, and decision processes become more unstructured with few rules, 
personal decisions based upon their knowledge and experience will prevail.  The TMT as 
a group will rely upon each other’s expert competencies to make firm decisions in this 
new dynamic marketplace.  The Upper Echelon theory also suggests that the dominant 
coalition, in particular its top management team, influence organizational outcomes.  
Both the strategies and their effectiveness are viewed as reflections of the values and 
cognitive basis of the top management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Madsen, Mosakowski, and Zaheer (2003) suggest that personnel new to a firm 
may broaden the firm’s knowledge stock without disrupting the way it is organized.  The 
TMT of an acquired firm play a role in transporting knowledge within the newly 
combined firm, which is crucial to knowledge production and development (Argote and 
Ingram, 2002).  Also the TMT may provide the acquiring firm with access to knowledge 
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that is novel or different (Gruenfeld et al, 2000) and can act as conduits for the transfer of 
fine-grained information (Kraatz and Moore, 2002).
2.7 Summary:
We overviewed the logic behind the acquisition strategy and the related theories.  
The differing types of acquisitions (vertical, horizontal, conglomerate and concentric) are 
discussed and compared to the top management teams’ value for each.  We then explored 
the value of the TMT through both Upper Echelon Theory and the Resourced Based 
View.  These perspectives suggest that the TMT is a valuable asset to the firm, and may 
be of value in the target firm even after acquisition.  In regard to the TMT and 
acquisitions, other previous research presents a mixed picture.  We analyzed the 
Resourced Based view from a dynamic capabilities perspective and knowledge based 
perspective.  These theoretical viewpoints complement the resource based viewpoint of 
the TMT and their value to a firm.  The following Chapter Three theoretically draws from 
this literature review to develop our model and the hypotheses for testing.
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Chapter Three
Theoretical Model and Hypothesis Development
3.0   Overview
3.1 Top Management Team: Retention – Pre-acquisition Performance
3.2 Retention and Post-Acquisition Performance
3.3   TMT Characteristics to Post Acquisition Performance:  Introduction
3.3a TMT Characteristic Network to Post-Acquisition Performance:
3.3b TMT Characteristic Knowledge to Post-Acquisition Performance:
3.3c  TMT Characteristic Dynamic Capabilities to Post-Acquisition 
Performance:
3.4  Competitive Dynamics Moderating the value of the TMT 
Characteristics (Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to 
Post-Acquisition Performance
3.5  Type of Acquisition moderating the value TMT characteristics 
(Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to Post-Acquisition 
Performance: Overview
3.5a  Related Horizontal Acquisitions moderating the value TMT 
characteristics (Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to 
Post-Acquisition Performance
3.5b Related Vertical Acquisitions moderating the value TMT 
characteristics (Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to 
Post-Acquisition Performance
3.5c Unrelated Acquisitions moderating the value TMT characteristics 





As the reader may recall, this research explores acquisitions and the value of the 
TMT from a viewpoint that combines the Upper Echelon perspective of top management 
teams with a resource based view of them (e.g. Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 
1993).  The Upper Echelon perspective suggests that there is a linkage between top 
management characteristics and the development of strategic assets so that the 
organization becomes a reflection of the TMT.  The development of this “reflection” 
assists in explaining the competitive behavior of the firm.  The resource based view 
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argues that organizations accumulate and develop a bundle of specialized resources that 
are both tangible and intangible.  These resources, when applied appropriately, should 
generate above average returns and can create a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993).  The resource based view offers that 
physical, human, and organizational resources are an organization’s source of 
competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, non-substitutable and inimitable 
(Barney, 1991).  The top management team (TMT) has control over all organizational 
resources, to one degree or another and may be the valuable resource that attracts 
acquisition attempts.   Together these theories suggest a perspective about the TMT and 
their role in which acquisitions occur due to these valuable resources augmenting the
purchaser’s own stock to compete effectively in the new global marketplace.
This section presents our model concerning the role of the acquired firm’s TMTs 
in the post acquisition success of the acquired firm.  Using the perspective we described 
in chapter 2 and summarized above, this dissertation suggests that a key source of a 
firm’s success may be the TMT (Conner, 1991; Olavarrieta, 1996).  The acquired firm’s 
TMT is an important component of the embedded resources that the acquiring firm seeks 
to secure through acquisition (Barney 1991; Castanias and Helfat, 1991).  Strategic 
leadership of the TMT will have a significant impact on organizational strategy and 
performance and be the source of a strategic competitive advantage (Lado, Boyd and 
Wright, 1992). 
The model will predict the effect of prior acquisition performance and retention of 
the TMT.  The model will also predict the effect of TMT retention and post acquisition 
performance, where competing views are presented.  The model will predict how TMT 
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characteristics (knowledge, dynamic capability and network) affect post acquisition 
performance. These TMT characteristics are moderated by competitive dynamics and 
type of acquisition on post acquisition performance.
3.1  Top Management Team: Retention – Pre-acquisition Performance
This dissertation focuses on the target firm’s TMT, their characteristics, and post 
acquisition performance, therefore we must first explore whether the TMT should be, or 
is, retained.  The TMT leads the firm, directs resources, develops and implements 
strategy, and motivates employees.  This dissertation’s perspective suggests that a firm 
acquires another firm due to its resources, which have been developed by the TMT, or 
which may very well be the TMT.  TMT retention as a group is important as in 
accordance with Simon’s (1945) idea of bounded rationality, that the creation of new 
knowledge, acquisition of existing knowledge, and storage of knowledge cannot be 
performed by one individual.  Therefore the TMT are experts that specialize in particular 
areas of knowledge.  Knowledge based theory suggests that the TMT develops rules and 
directives to facilitate knowledge integration based upon specialist expertise (Grant, 
1996).  Also knowledge assets remain with individual employees and cannot be readily 
transferred with the most complex tacit knowledge resident in the TMT.  From this 
argument, it would follow that the greater the loss of the members of the TMT, the less 
effectively the TMT will perform.
Contrarily the synergy hypothesis from the market for corporate control literature 
proposes that acquisitions take place when the value of the combined firm is greater than 
the sum of the values of the individual firms (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Seth, 1990).  
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This synergy has at its core the recognition of potential sources deriving from 
interdependencies between the value chains of the two organizations (Pablo, 1994).  The 
synergistic gain in acquisitions is derived from an increase in operational efficiency, an 
increase in market power, or some form of financial gain (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; 
Seth, 1990).  Following an acquisition, some degree of interorganizational integration is 
necessary (Datta, 1991).  Some researchers have suggested that the acquired firms’ top 
management team may be dismissed as the top managers of the acquiring firms are 
expected to manage, or at least provide a plan for managing, newly acquired firms 
(Jemison, 1988; Schweiger and Weber, 1989) as management incompatibility results in 
dropping productivity and poor post-acquisition performance (Ivancevich, Schweiger and 
Power, 1987).  Theory suggests that increases to future cash flows could be realized from 
economies of scope that also can be inferred that the targets TMT departure increases 
future cash flows (Panzar and Willig, 1981, Teece, 1981).
Over time, the top management team develops collective mental maps around 
their current strategy (Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 1992) and a successful strategy has 
achieved legitimacy with key stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  In this way, the 
current strategy becomes protected from challenge and the longer the strategy is in place, 
the stronger its acceptance within and without the organization (Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985) regardless of whether it is working or not.  This same legitimacy also serves to 
protect the TMT who are seen as the embodiment of that strategy (Edstrom and 
Galbraith, 1997).  Therefore in declining performance, the TMT is a detriment to 
stakeholders and the market for corporate control could be the only resort.
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Research suggests that acquisitions often occur as a useful external control 
mechanism for removing managers who fail to maximize firm value (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989; Martin and McConnell, 1991; Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 1993).  The 
threat of acquisition is a useful mechanism for encouraging managers to pursue 
shareholder wealth maximization strategies and corporate control is a valuable asset 
actively traded in a market (Manne, 1965).  
By examining the substantial increase of executives leaving the firm following an 
acquisition, researchers have supported the assertion of the market for corporate control 
(e.g., Martin and McConnell, 1991; Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996).  Past research suggests that changes in 
corporate control through acquisition are followed by above-normal levels of turnover 
among target firm executives (Furtado and Karan, 1990; Walsh, 1988).  For example the 
corporate raiders of the 1980’s have acknowledged that the replacement of entrenched 
and ineffective managers was a primary motive for their raids on corporations (Icahn, 
1988; Pickens, 1986; Walsh and Koznick, 1993).  
Acquisitions could be largely attributed to the failure of internal management 
control practices (Seward and Walsh, 1995) and are strongly linked to internal control 
systems that did not correctly align managers’ strategic actions with that of the 
shareholders goals (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994).  As the internal market is inadequate, the 
acquisition is an external mechanism of control transfer that increases share value by 
reallocating control rights to more efficient management (Choi, 1991).  Following a 
successful acquisition, the bidder can replace the incumbent with a more competent team 
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of managers or he can force the management to follow policies and strategies that are 
consistent with the shareholder value maximization (Martin and McConnell, 1991).
However, our research focuses on the TMT as a source of value.  When top 
managers depart when developing the cost savings from synergies, much needed 
resources and expertise may be lost hindering post-acquisition integration (Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993).  Synergy development is more 
important in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions because synergy requires 
operating efficiencies and economies of scale through high levels of integration (Porter,
1985; Salter and Weinhold, 1978; Shrivastava, 1986).  The more synergy that is 
expected, as in related acquisitions, the more collaboration and cooperation are required 
from the acquired firm (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Souder and Chakrabarti, 1984).  
In summary, the TMT is necessary in both unrelated acquisitions due to their expertise in 
the new industry of which the acquiring firm’s TMT is ignorant, and are important in 
related acquisitions to assist in synergy development.
Loss of the TMT can be compared to the downsizing of a firm.  The downsizing 
literature suggests that firms undergo a deterioration of communication at many levels 
(Cascio, 1993) even though communication is particularly important at the time of 
downsizing, as well as during acquisitions (Rosenblatt, Rogers and Nord, 1993).  
Dismissal of the TMT during the acquisition period also will affect the communication 
within the firm and will aggravate the high levels of uncertainty (Tombaugh and White, 
1990).  Also the loss of the acquired TMT could affect creativity or innovation and 
negatively affect the post-acquisition performance of the acquired firm.  Some of the 
environmental factors that are considered important for creativity and innovation in 
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organizations are an open information flow and support for new ideas at all levels of the 
organization, from top management, through immediate supervisors to work groups
(Robbins and Decenzo, 2004).
To alleviate potential post-acquisition problems, many purchasers may be more 
inclined to make changes and increase governance (Krug and Hegarty, 1997).  After 
acquisition the purchasing organization strives to create a situation where all the internal 
and external resources are joined, working together towards the mutual goals and 
objectives.  The target TMT’s participation in the buy-in, development and 
implementation of known monitoring systems is essential to engender cooperation 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1993).
Following an acquisition, some degree of interorganizational integration is 
necessary, ranging from very little for unrelated acquisitions to a great deal for those 
firms that were acquired for synergy. However the level of integration to implement must 
be decided, as under- or over- integration can result in failure to create value, or have 
value destruction (Pablo, 1994).  The realization of potential synergies could fail with an 
insufficient level of integration, while excess reconfiguration can hurt as executives 
depart in unfavorable circumstances (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and 
Cannella, 1993; Walsh and Elwood, 1991).  
In summary, the acquiring firm may attempt to retain the TMT after acquisition if 
they facilitate the integration of the acquired firm, or are considered an integral part of the
value of the acquisition.  However, a poorly performing target firm may reflect poor 
management and retention of the TMT after acquisition is not desirable.  In accordance 
with the market for corporate control argument, firms become targets due to poor 
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performance from poor management.  Contrarily, from a resource based perspective 
where the TMT is viewed as valuable as these individuals lead the firm, direct resources, 
motivate, and are aware of the resources to develop the synergies that may arise between 
two firms, positive pre-acquisition performance could indicate their importance, thus the 
acquiring firm will attempt to retain them. Therefore;
H1:  The greater the pre-acquisition performance of the acquired firm, the more 
likely the TMT of the acquired firm will be retained
3.2 Retention and Post-Acquisition Performance
The importance of the top management team of an organization, the value of their 
strategic decisions and their influence on performance has been researched extensively in 
the management literature (Child, 1972; Volberda, 1996; Fiol, 1991; Lado and Wilson, 
1994; Lee and Miller, 1999). Many researchers focus on a managerial view of 
acquisitions with attention paid to how goals are developed, resources are allocated, and 
individual’s efforts are coordinated to build congruence in the overall direction adopted 
by the company that the TMT will facilitate after acquisition (Doz, 1991; Doz and 
Prahalad , 1986).  Loss of the TMT may impair the development of the new goals and 
role the acquisition will perform.  This loss of the TMT in turn will negatively affect the 
performance of the acquisition.
From the strategic choice perspective, Child (1972) claims that managers have 
discretion and that the decisions they make are of vital importance to the success of the 
organization.  Top management is often viewed as critically involved in formulating and 
implementing strategy to provide superior performance for the organizations.  The task of 
management is to provide dynamic capabilities for organizational flexibility and to 
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configure an organization for the preservation and control of technology, structure, and 
culture (Volberda, 1996).  The TMT thus is an integral part of the value of the acquisition 
by developing its strategy, organization, and leadership.  
The human dimension (the TMT in this instance) is critical to effective execution 
of strategy (Fiol, 1991; Lado and Wilson, 1994; Lee and Miller, 1999) as well as the 
development and dissemination of knowledge and organizational learning within the 
organization (Fiol, 1991; Hall, 1993; Miller and Shamsie, 1996).  A study by Lengnick-
Hall and Wolff (1999) using three perspectives in strategy (Resource based, 
Hypercompetitive and high-velocity, plus ecosystem and chaos theory-based views) 
established common themes concerning this human dimension. These concepts include: 
developing effective exchange relationships (e.g. Porter, 1985; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 
1988; Boeker, 1991), understanding that strategy and context are dynamic (e.g., Barney, 
1991; Collis, 1994; Levy, 1994), and emphasizing the performance “numerator” rather 
than the cost “denominator” (e.g., Barney, 1995; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Stacey, 
1995).  The performance “numerator” suggests a superiority of product or service that 
will require a talented top management team for continued post acquisition performance 
of the acquired firm.  In effect, loss of the top management team of the acquired 
organization may directly affect post acquisition performance of the acquired firm, 
exchange relationships (within and without the organization), and strategy regarding the 
specific market context.  Thus we propose:
H2a:  There is a positive relationship between post acquisition performance of the 
acquired firm and degree of retention of the top management team of the acquired 
organization.
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There are two contradictory views of the relationship between top management 
retention and post-acquisition performance.  Jensen (1993) states that the infrequency 
with which large corporate organizations restructure or redirect themselves solely on the 
basis of the internal control mechanisms in the absence of crises is strong testimony to 
the inadequacy of internal control mechanisms such as the Board of Directors and TMT 
incentive packages.  Although internal control mechanisms may not always be effective, 
the market for corporate control serves as a discipline of last resort when the internal 
corporate control mechanisms fail (Fama, 1980).  The theory of the market for corporate 
control suggest that as top managers engage in self-interested behavior, their company’s 
performance is likely to increasingly diverge from its maximum potential (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Manne, 1965; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; and Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b).  Due to this underperformance, other management teams are 
likely to offer themselves as alternatives to the incumbent management.  The market for 
corporate control is a manifestation of the competition among these management teams 
for the rights to manage particular corporate resources.  In an acquisition, the acquiring 
company’s expected gain resides “almost entirely in the expectation that it will be able to 
root out deadwood inefficiencies and put a target’s assets to better use” (Lowenstein, 
1983: p. 272).
The interpretation that acquisitions occur as natural forces in a market for 
corporate control is grounded in agency theory, which defines a corporation as a nexus of 
contracts and assumes that the relationship between professional corporate managers and 
stockholders is inherently imbued with conflicts of interest about risk orientations, time 
horizons, effort levels, and the payout of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986).  When other 
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mechanisms fail to influence managerial performance, the external market for corporate
control is initiated and the firm is acquired (Jensen, 1988).  
This view of the market for corporate control as an arena in which competing 
management teams vie for control of corporate assets provides the “mechanism through 
which economies of scale or other synergies available from combining or reorganizing 
control and management of corporate resources are realized” (Jensen and Ruback, 1983, 
p. 6).  Thus acquisitions will attempt to cut costs through economies of scale or 
development of other synergies.  As the TMT of the target firms is assumed to be 
inadequate, and is costly as they are paid the most, subsequent dismissal of the target’s 
TMT after acquisition is assumed to occur.  
Acquisitions also are viewed as a solution to the agency problems arising between 
managers and stockholders, since the threat of acquisition focuses managers on the goal 
of shareholder wealth maximization (Philippatos and Baird, 1996).  Findings have also 
suggested that successful, better performing firms make acquisitions of poorly-
performing companies and subsequently create greater value (Servaes, 1991). Poor 
performance predicts executive turnover (Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Friedman and Singh, 
1989; Bonnier and Bruner, 1989) and a Board will dismiss its top managers if its firm is 
performing poorly compared to other firms in the industry (Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, 
1988). Therefore, following acquisition, from the market for corporate control 
perspective, the acquiring firm will likely dismiss the underperforming TMT, and replace 
them with their own TMT.  As such we present a competing argument:
H2b: There is a negative relationship between post acquisition performance of 
the acquired firm and degree of retention of the top management team of the 
acquired organization.
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3.3  TMT Characteristics to Post Acquisition Performance:  Introduction
“Owing to uncertainty, complexity, and conflict (both in and outside the 
organization), different organizations will employ different strategic assets, without any 
one set being probably optimal or easily imitated” (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993: 44).  
The emphasis in the strategic literature has shifted from viewing competitive advantage 
as primarily determined by environmental (industry/market) factors to a resource based 
view (cf. Wernerfelt, 1984).  In essence, how the TMT employs the resources in reaction 
to market pressures and the firm’s environment, affects the success of a strategy.  
Knowledge based resources, such as the TMT and their experience, assist in the 
development of the organization’s strategy, core competencies, and subsequently its 
value (Miller and Shamsie, 1996).  While the influences of the firm’s external 
environment cannot be ignored, many companies’ success hinges on the quality of their 
leadership (Nadler, 1998).  Although the resource based view addresses the importance of 
internal resources, the Dynamic Capabilities perspective takes the RBV to the next level 
and addresses the employment of internal resources in response to external pressures.  So 
both the internal and external environment affects a firm’s strategy and their success.  
Therefore it is important to model the effects of TMT characteristics include both 
internal and external components.  TMT networks of relationships within the firm (e.g., 
peers, managers, employees, joint ventures) and external networks of relationships (e.g., 
suppliers, banks, distributors, customers) can be a valuable asset to the firm.  The TMT 
knowledge of the firm internally (e.g., strategy, expert, personnel, intangible assets and 
liabilities) and external (e.g., competitors, industry, product, market pressures) also will 
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affect firm performance.  Lastly, the dynamic capability to apply the internal networks, 
knowledge and assets to external pressures and marketplace dynamism will also affect 
firm success.  This section attempts to theoretically ascertain which characteristics of the 
TMT (network, knowledge, and dynamic capabilities) are valuable in acquisitions
3.3a TMT Characteristic Network to Post-Acquisition Performance:
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) suggests that TMT 
characteristics affect organizational outcomes.  Researchers have identified that there are 
as many ways to operationalize TMTs characteristics and behaviors as there are studies 
examining these issues (Pegels and Yang, 2000).  One of the characteristics important to 
a TMT is the network of relationships in which the TMT is embedded in, both external 
and internal.  For example, the advice network that a TMT forms to acquire and share 
tacit knowledge throughout the organization is a key coordinating mechanism 
(Athanssiou and Nigh, 1999).  Also, the internal network focuses on productivity, 
innovation, and labor relations, while the external network will focus on competition, 
customers and new product/market opportunities (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990).
TMTs develop external networks of relationships between firms and then 
maintain them.  What makes a network of firm relationships so important is the quality of 
relationships and shared values, with relationships defined as: non-hierarchical/long-term 
commitments, multiple roles and responsibilities, mutuality, and affiliational sentiments 
(Anderson and Narus, 1991).  Therefore, what differentiates the network-oriented 
organization are its density, multiple levels of complexity, and reciprocity of ties, plus a 
shared value system defining membership roles and responsibilities.  Research suggests 
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that networks should add value to firms (Achrol 1997).  The TMT’s network of 
relationships in which the firm is embedded will represent a significant contribution to 
the firm success.
The ambiguous, complex, and fluid configuration of firms that constitute a 
network, and the personal relationships of the members developed over time, create value 
for the firms (Hakansson and Johanson, 1993).  Each network member’s identity 
communicates a certain orientation toward other actors; it conveys a certain competence, 
because it is based on each actor’s perceived capability to perform certain actions (Albert 
and Whetton, 1985) and is based on the particular resources each actor possess 
(Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook, 1988).  The TMT administers these relationships, 
chooses appropriate compatible partners, and maintains the relationships.
A major source of information and network maintenance is the TMT as a 
boundary spanner.  Boundary spanning communication is important to organizations as a 
source of new information and awareness of environmental changes (Weedman, 1992).  
Boundary spanning refers to the effective interaction between an organization and its 
external environment.  As a lynchpin, the TMT assures an even flow of information 
between the parties involved.  Meaningful communication between firms in a working 
partnership is a necessary antecedent to trust and in subsequent periods the accumulation 
of trust leads to better communication (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  This vital transference 
of information allows the parties to share strategic views on the external market 
environment, mutually decide a course of action internally, and then implement the 
decision.  When a boundary-spanning function is executed appropriately, the organization 
may be better able to manage its environment effectively.
49
Networks of relationships within and without the firm are important for the TMT 
dynamic capability.  For example, explicit knowledge that is not embodied in specific 
products may not be efficiently transferred.  However, alliances and networks of these 
alliances may be well suited to the transfer and integration of this knowledge 
(Liebeskind, 1996).  Another consideration is the speed to which this knowledge is 
transferred. Networks of firms sharing knowledge will permit knowledge to be 
transferred more quickly then relying purely on the market (Grant, 1996; Smith, 1996; 
Richardson, 1996).  From the dynamic capabilities perspective, the network strategy 
involves the routines by which the TMT reconnect webs of collaborations among various 
parts of the firm to generate new and synergistic resource combinations among 
businesses (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000).  These network alliances bring new resources 
into the firm from external sources (Gulati, 1999; Capron, et. al., 1998; Zollo and Singh, 
1998).  We make the following prediction concerning TMT networks: 
H3 There is a positive relationship between the quality of the acquired firm 
TMT’s networks and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
3.3b TMT Characteristic Knowledge to Post-Acquisition Performance:
According to Hambrick and Mason’s upper echelons theory (1984), the TMT 
impacts organizational outcomes because of their decisions.  These decisions are based 
upon the TMT’s personal knowledge of the organization (internal), market, and industry 
(external), intertwined with their personal experiences and expert knowledge.  Other 
TMT members, through personal contact, can only understand any TMT member’s tacit 
knowledge over time (Winter, 1987).  Today’s marketplace is becoming more 
knowledge-based so knowledge and the competencies built upon a knowledge platform 
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are key factors in determining an organization’s current and future value (Grant, 1996; 
Hamel, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996; Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 
2001; Seth, Song and Petit, 2002; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  Knowledge has emerged as 
the most strategically significant resource of the organization as increasing turbulence of 
the external business environment has focused attention upon resources and 
organizational capabilities (Grant, 1996; Quinn, 1992).  The TMT has tacit knowledge in 
regard to strategy, organizational strengths and weakness, the industry, etc., which is a 
valuable commodity to the firm.  Also, the TMT develops routines that create knowledge 
flows throughout the organization.  
Knowledge is information laden with experience, truth, judgment, intuition, and 
values; a unique combination that allows individuals and organizations to assess new 
situations and manage change (Huseman and Goodman, 1999).  Differences in the 
knowledge possessed by different individuals are implicit in the concept of asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1985).  More broadly, these differences motivate individuals to 
specialize in various aspects of business activity, including the TMT (Connor and 
Prahalad, 1996).  It is corporate level knowledge that constitutes the stable generation 
mechanism of strategic behaviors.  The strategic behavior design process consists of 
information interpretation and processing and is structured by corporate-level knowledge, 
usually possessed by the TMT (Kuwada, 1998).  
In summary, the TMT is important to the collection and dissemination of 
knowledge.  Often the TMT knowledge is tacit and its value is due to its inimitability.  
Also, the TMT generates a culture of knowledge creation and dissemination within their 
own target organization through corporate culture development.  As nearly all 
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acquisitions are related (noted earlier), the TMT knowledge becomes even more 
important.  In essence, the TMT, from a knowledge based perspective, can be a source of 
competitive advantage.  Therefore; 
H4 There is a positive relationship between the quality of the acquired firm 
TMT’s knowledge and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
3.3c  TMT Characteristic Dynamic Capabilities to Post-Acquisition Performance:
TMT dynamic capabilities utilizes TMT knowledge garnish from their internal 
and external networks, and is the conduit for strategic direction.  Hambrick and Mason’s 
(1984) Upper Echelon perspective suggested examining the relationship between TMT 
and the organizational outcomes of strategic choices and performance levels.  Other 
studies have supported this perspective and have found a link between TMT and strategic 
innovation and performance (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Norburn and Birley, 1988).  
TMT dynamic capabilities inferred by the Upper Echelon perspective is the ability of an 
organization to anticipate and respond to opportunities or pressures for change, both 
internal and external (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  
How the TMT employs the firm’s assets, and how quickly, affects the success of a 
strategy in today’s global competition (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998b).  This asset 
employment can be called dynamic capabilities, which refer to the development of 
management capabilities and difficult-to-imitate combinations of organizational, 
functional and technological skills to gain/sustain a competitive advantage (Teece, et al., 
1997). The TMT has a major role in this process.  Dynamic capabilities necessitate 
having the TMT develop overall organizational coherence while recognizing the unique 
features of the internal and external environment to facilitate customization of strategies 
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while focusing attention on the adaptation, integration and reconfiguring of both internal 
and relational resources to match the opportunities in the global and local marketplaces 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece et al., 1997).  The TMT’s decisions as to the direction and 
employment of strategically key resources are often what create value for firms.  
Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines, by which firms 
achieve new resource reconfigurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
Without TMT effective strategic leadership, the probability that a firm can 
perform well when confronting the challenges of the global economy is greatly reduced 
(Davids, 1995). Dynamic capabilities are the antecedent organizational and strategic 
routines by which the TMT alter their resource base by acquiring and shedding resources, 
integrating them together and recombining them, to generate new value-creating 
strategies (Grant, 1996; Pisano, 1994).  
H5 There is a positive relationship between the quality of the acquired firm 
TMT’s dynamic capability and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
3.4  Competitive Dynamics Moderating the value of the TMT Characteristics 
(Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to Post-Acquisition 
Performance
The value of the TMT network, knowledge and dynamic capabilities are not 
independent of the context in which they are found.  Rather this dissertation suggests that 
these constructs’ effects will vary based upon the competitive dynamics of the industry.  
As the competitive dynamics varies from mild to moderate to intense, the value of the 
TMT’s characteristics will either be more or less valuable in regard to post acquisition 
performance.  The type of market will affect how a firm’s resources are organized, 
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employed and subsequently integrated by the top managers (Barney; 1986; 1988; Dietrix 
and Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1984; 1987; Wernerfelt, 1984; 1995).  For example, the market 
type also affects knowledge as it becomes the most strategically significant resource of 
the organization as the increasing turbulence of the external business environment has 
focused attention upon resources and organizational capabilities (Grant, 1996; Quinn, 
1992).
However the conceptualization and measurement of competitive dynamics of an 
industry continues to be illusive in past literature, which has implications for strategic 
management research (Bluedorn, et al., 1994; Bluedorn, 1993; Boyd et al, 1993; 
Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dess and Rasheed, 1991; Sharfman and Dean, 1991a, 1991b; 
Aldrich, 1979; Tosi et al., 1973).  Although most researchers agree that the concept of 
industry competitive dynamics is composed of multiple dimensions (Boyd, 1995) three 
general dimensions are typically utilized: munificence, dynamism and complexity 
(Bluedorn, 1993; Dess and Beard, 1984; Aldrich, 1979).  We have utilized these 
dimensions as put forth by Dess and Beard (1984), paralleling other strategic literature 
(Keats and Hitt, 1988; Lawless and Finch, 1989; Boyd, 1995; Goll and Rasheed, 1997; Li 
and Simerly, 1998; Simerly and Li, 2000).  Other researchers however have raised a 
number of questions regarding the measurement and validity of this analysis (e.g., 
Sharfman and Dean, 1991a, 1991b).  Other researchers have also used subjective 
measures (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969; Duncan, 1972; Miles and Snow, 1978; Tan 
2002, Boyd and Faulk, 1996) and other researchers have utilized a combination of 
subjective and objective measures (e.g., Tung, 1979; Tosi et al., 1973).
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In emphasizing how an organization develops its strategy, competitive dynamics
have been developed based upon pricing patterns over time (Klepper and Grady, 1990).  
Competitive dynamics play a role in acquisitions as the level of integration to implement 
must be decided, as under- or over- integration can result in failure to create value, or 
have value destruction (Pablo, 1994).    The environment of a market will influence the 
organizational and strategic routines, by which firms achieve new resource 
reconfigurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).  Also, organizations have time-based interdependencies between their 
resources and their environment (Williamson, 1992). 
Moderate markets are characterized by products facing direct competition for 
extended periods with the organizations typically designed to serve high volume markets 
(Chandler, 1990).  The firm’s isolating mechanisms are less powerful then those in the 
mild market as their resources are less specialized, they serve mass markets, and 
competitors have more incentive and ability to imitate (Williams, 1992).  
The firms in a moderate market must continue to have ongoing financial and 
organizational commitments and complex learning processes that must be coordinated 
across the organization in spite of intense resource imitation pressures (Bower and Hout, 
1988).  In such markets, buyer supplier relations are moderately stable so TMT networks 
may be valuable after acquisition.  Economies of experience are considered moderate but 
organizational learning and imitation pressures are important (Nayyar, 1993) so TMT 
knowledge after acquisition may also be important.  
In the mild markets, the key to sustaining a competitive advantage often depends 
upon gaining a resource or capability that is idiosyncratic: (e.g. patents, copyrights, 
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geography) plus then protecting and maintaining this proprietary competitive advantage 
(Smith, Grimm, Wally and Young, 1997).  Product advantage is secured within the firm 
and competitors cannot attract the company’s customers away (Williamson, 1989; 
Scitovsky, 1990).  Mild market products often need only low levels of reinvestment to 
sustain them (e.g., aerospace and defense) and rely on guild like skills (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).  Similarly, firms develop binding relationships with clients bolstering 
personal contacts that take a long time to nurture and grow (e.g., investment banking 
industry) (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1987).
Organizations in mild markets align with the idiosyncratic needs of the customer 
over a period of time.  These relationship-based advantages often cannot be duplicated 
creating barriers to other firms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Powerful, relationship-
based barriers in certain industries (e.g. telecommunications, financial services, health 
care) have been identified, but the importance of these relationship-based resources and 
its competitive forces are often overlooked in research (Williams, 1992).
Mild markets have stable and long term buyer and supplier relationships based 
upon close personal contact (Williams, 1992).  Therefore after acquisition, the network of 
relationships developed by the TMT will be of importance in this type of market.  As the 
key to being competitive is to protect, maintain and extend their idiosyncratic resource, 
the TMT’s dynamic capability will not be as valuable in this marketplace after 
acquisition.  The TMT’s strategy and knowledge of the marketplace and industry will not 
be as important after acquisition in mild markets. 
Intense markets are when products are copied quickly and first mover advantage 
for many of the products does not yield sustainable competitive advantage.  This type of 
56
marketplace could be classified as the information revolution where products can be 
based on ideas that are easy to copy and customer loyalty is fleeting (Williams, 1992).  
As pure creativity is often the basis of advantage, economic value is created and 
destroyed quickly.
Prices fall very quickly in intense markets so companies need to profit from their 
products quickly. These markets have placed a strategic strain on many organizations. 
The enduring characteristics are: 1) that relative competitive advantages are very time-
sensitive, and therefore erode very quickly, requiring that core competencies of global 
organizations must be rejuvenated constantly; 2) that strategies must be formulated 
continuously to seize competitive initiative resulting only in a temporary market 
advantage; 3) that there needs to be a modification in the conventional wisdom relative to 
timeframes with attention being given to shorter and shorter life-cycles [i.e., product, 
technology, organizational, relationship and the like]; 4) that the redefinition of industry 
boundaries, due to deregulation and the intrusion of non-traditional competitors entering 
the industry, will continue to occur; and 5) that the environment of industries and 
competition are forever increasing or quickening, necessitating management to address 
constant change and time as the common bases of global competition (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Fine, 1998; Davis & Meyer, 1998; Hitt, Keats & De Marie, 1998; 
Ireland & Hitt, 1999).
In intense markets, network buyer and supplier relations are unstable, temporary 
and brand loyalty is low, and so TMT networks after acquisition should not be as 
important.  The ability to change the firm and react to the dynamism of the marketplace 
and ability to acquire knowledge will be extremely important in this market type.  In 
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summary, the competitive dynamics (i.e. mild/moderate/intense) will moderate the 
relationship between TMT characteristics and performance of the acquisition.
H6a:  The competitive dynamics positively m oderates the relationship between the
quality of TMT knowledge and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm. 
H6b: The competitive dynamics positively moderates the relationship between the 
quality of TMT dynamic capabilities and post acquisition performance of the 
acquired firm. 
H6c:  The competitive dynamics positively moderates the relationship of the 
quality of TMT’s networks and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
3.5 Type of Acquisition moderating the value TMT characteristics (Network, 
Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to Post-Acquisition Performance: 
Overview
This section discusses the relationship between type of acquisition (related 
horizontal, related vertical, and unrelated) to the TMT characteristics (Network, 
Knowledge, and dynamic capability).  Earlier we suggest that the TMT characteristics of 
network, knowledge and dynamic capability positively correlate to post-acquisition 
performance.  Here, we will explore whether the value of these TMT characteristics to 
post-acquisition performance will vary based upon the type of acquisition, due to the 
acquisition-type perhaps requiring differing skills for success.  This research hopes to 
explore in more depth, the relationship between the TMT characteristics moderated by 
the type of acquisitions to post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.  Past 
research has attempted to explain TMT retention with acquisition-type, with varying 
success and disparity.  We hope to explore the actual dynamics of the relationship based 
upon the TMT characteristics required, and not just retention.
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Relatedness has been defined as the extent to which acquired and acquiring firms 
serve similar customers, or utilize similar production processes (Rumelt, 1982; Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979; Porter, 1987).  Research suggests the type of acquisition affects the 
value of the TMT, as it is suggested that synergy development is more important in 
related than in unrelated acquisitions, as to achieve the benefits of operating efficiencies 
and economies of scale will require high levels of integration (Porter, 1985; Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979; Shrivastava, 1986).  The more synergy is expected, as in related 
acquisitions, the more collaboration is required (Singh and Montgomery, 1987) and 
greater cooperation from the acquired firm (Souder and Chakrabarti, 1984).  Contrarily, 
other past research has suggested that management retention should be more important in 
unrelated acquisitions than in related ones, since the target firms’ TMT are likely to be 
more familiar with their operation then the acquiring firm (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; 
Walsh, 1988).  This contradiction illustrates the quandary of associating TMT retention 
with acquisition-type without exploring more in-depth the construct for retention, or that 
of the TMT specific characteristic and its value to acquisition type.
Research has attempted to extend the boundaries and importance of the type of 
acquisition with post acquisition performance.  As traditional measures looked at 
relatedness only at the industry or market level, other research attempted to explore 
relatedness of resources between firms (Markides and Williamson, 1994).  However, 
previous research has not explored the particular characteristics (such knowledge, 
dynamic capability, or networks) that are imbued in the TMT, to assist in explaining the 
reasons for retention.  In this research we consider the three categories of relatedness 
similar to Cannella and Hambrick (1993): 1) related horizontal (acquiring competitors), 
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2) related vertical acquisitions, and 2) unrelated (when two firms are not in the same 
industry). 
 
3.5a  Related Horizontal Acquisitions moderating the value TMT characteristics 
(Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to Post-Acquisition 
Performance
In related horizontal acquisitions, research suggests that the acquiring firm’s 
management should have the same knowledge and skills relevant to make the decisions 
for the acquired firm, which is consistent with the market for corporate control argument 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Porter, 1987; Datta, 1991).  Therefore the target TMT’s
characteristic of knowledge will not be of value to the acquiring firm.  A motive for a 
horizontal acquisition is to create synergy by consolidation or through economies of 
scope (Amit and Livnat, 1988).  Also, this type of acquisition might enhance market 
power, allowing it to improve its long term competitive position.  The dynamic 
capabilities of a target TMT will also not be valuable in this association as the two firms 
are combining in the same industry.
Research suggests that horizontal acquisitions with similar characteristics result in 
higher acquisition performance than those of dissimilar characteristics as the integration 
goes more smoothly (Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill, 2001).  Horizontal 
acquisitions may also benefit from increased size and access to new resource niches, as 
well as reducing the overlap among products targeted at particular resource niches, and 
hence the intensity of competition (Barnett and Freeman, 2001).  Horizontal acquisitions 
also efficiently share their assets and form similar baskets of knowledge and will 
outperform unrelated acquisitions (Lubatkin, Srinivasan, Merchant, 1997; Seth, 1990).
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Also, horizontal mergers occur due to cost-based synergies (exploitation of scale 
and scope) and revenue-enhancement synergies by mobilizing core competencies 
(Capron, et al, 1998).  Several studies show that asset divestiture (i.e. the elimination of 
redundant activities and inefficient management practices) improves the acquisition 
performance of horizontal acquisitions (Anand and Singh, 1997; Tremblay and Tremblay, 
1988).  However, elimination of the target firm TMT’s networks of relationships with 
customers and suppliers may cause poorer post-acquisition performance due to loss of 
revenues (customers) or preferred discounts (suppliers).
Therefore in horizontal acquisitions, the acquirer TMT will have similar 
knowledge as that of the acquired firm’s TMT and not value the TMT knowledge.  The 
target firm’s TMT dynamic capabilities may not be of value as the two firms are 
combining and not reacting to the marketplace.  However, the TMT network of 
relationships with internal and external (such as customers, key personnel, strategic 
alliances, etc.) will continue to be important. 
H7.1a:  Horizontal acquisitions will positively moderate the value of the TMT 
networks to acquisition performance. 
H7.1b:  Horizontal acquisitions will negatively moderate the value of the TMT 
dynamic capabilities to acquisition performance. 
H7.1c:  Horizontal acquisitions will negatively moderate the value of the TMT 
knowledge to post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
3.5b Related Vertical Acquisitions moderating the value TMT characteristics 
(Network, Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to Post-Acquisition 
Performance
As noted above, research suggests the purchasing firm’s TMT in a related 
horizontal acquisition may have much of the knowledge and skills of the acquired 
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managers, and the acquired managers become unnecessary (Cannella and Hambrick, 
1993).  However, in related vertical acquisitions, although the TMT of the acquiring firm 
is well versed in the industry, the target firm TMT’s knowledge is greater in regard to the 
firm specific processes and operations.  Synergy is the ability to obtain gains that result 
from commonalities or complementarities between acquirer and target that enable the 
combined value of the organizations to exceed their value as two independent entities 
(Hayward, 1997).  The TMT’s knowledge of their firm’s assets and capabilities, as well 
as their network of relationships will facilitate synergy development.  Unlike an agency 
type motive, the synergy motive assumes that managers of both acquiring and target 
companies have value maximizing goals that result in economies of scale or scope 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993).  Therefore the target firm’s TMT’s knowledge is 
valuable in related vertical acquisition.
Other research suggests that the role of synergy will be to develop economies of 
scope and elimination of dual positions, such as the TMT of the target firm.  However, 
simply amortizing existing assets though economies of scope will yield short-term 
benefits only, if at all (Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000).  In addition, the activities that 
are necessary to exploit synergy will require significant cooperation amongst the business 
units and blunt the benefits of the strategy (Nayyar, 1993).  The target firm TMT’s 
dynamic capabilities will facilitate the development of the synergy as well as 
reconfiguring the organizations assets and structure.  Synergy cannot be achieved without 
intrafirm exchanges that lead to inefficiencies result from governance costs (arising from 
coordination and integration demands), incentive degradation (as a result of agency 
effects) and bureaucratic distortions (Jones and Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1985).  Therefore 
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the internal network of relationships developed by the target firm’s TMT will be of value.  
Also, synergy is difficult as impediments result from a lack of communication between 
units, problems allocating joint costs, incentive distortions generated form intrafirm 
conflict (rather than from necessary cooperation amongst managers), and incompatible 
technologies (Nayyar, 1993).  In short, synergies fall short of management expectations 
(Goold and Campbell, 1998).  To develop synergy, cooperation is required as well as 
knowledge of their own firm’s resources.   Thus the internal knowledge of the target firm 
will valuable.  The TMT will provide the valuable knowledge and networks of 
relationships that will affect the performance of the acquisition.  To adapt the target firm 
through changes to develop complementarities, the target firm TMT’s dynamic 
capabilities will be required.
H7.2a: Vertical acquisitions will positively moderate the value of TMT knowledge 
with post acquisition performance of the acquired firm. 
H7.2b: Vertical acquisitions will positively moderate the value of the TMT 
networks with post acquisition performance of the acquired firm. 
H7.2c: Vertical acquisitions will positively moderate the value of the TMT 
dynamic capabilities with post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
3.5c Unrelated Acquisitions moderating the value TMT characteristics (Network, 
Knowledge, and Dynamic Capability) to Post-Acquisition Performance
In unrelated acquisitions, the acquiring firm typically desires strategic continuity 
in the acquired firm and acts like a passive investor (Pitts, 1976; Salter and Weinhold, 
1979; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1988).  The unrelated acquisition creates value through 
financial economies, or cost savings realized through improved allocations of financial 
resources based on investments inside or outside the firm (Hill, 1994).  Unrelated 
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acquisition may provide gains from internal capital market allocation relative to the 
external capital market (Billet and Mauer, 2001).  Therefore, the dynamic capabilities of 
the target firm’s TMT may not be valuable, as the acquiring firm may wish strategic 
continuity and not continual change and reconfiguration of resources.
In unrelated acquisitions and the value of the target TMT, past research has 
suggested that it is more important to retain the TMT in conglomerate acquisitions, as 
their knowledge of the unrelated business is greater than that of the acquirer.  Cartwright 
and Cooper (1993) suggested that in this type of unrelated acquisition the target TMT 
knows the business better then the acquiring firm, so their knowledge is important for 
post acquisition success.  Unrelated acquisitions may present some unique advantages 
primarily through financial synergies as industry-specific risk can be reduced only 
through extra-industry diversification (Kim, Hwang, Burgers, 1989).  Therefore, 
unrelated diversification can reduce risk since this strategy involves business units in 
multiple industries (Amit and Livnat, 1998; Barney, 1995).  The lower risk that results 
from portfolio effects and reduced probabilities of bankruptcy can also lead to increased 
debt capacity and enjoy reduced taxes (Seth, 1990; Amit and Livnat, 1998).  Also the 
network of internal and external relationship continuation by the target firm’s TMT will 
positively affect post acquisition performance.
H7.3a:  Unrelated acquisitions will positively moderate the value of the TMT 
networks with post acquisition performance of the acquired firm. 
H7.3b:  Unrelated acquisitions will negatively moderate the value of the TMT 
dynamic capabilities with post acquisition performance of the acquired firm. 
H7.3c:  Unrelated acquisitions will positively moderate the value of the TMT 
knowledge with post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
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3.6 Summary
An important research question that researchers continue to explore is the 
disposition of the TMT subsequent to acquisition and the impact on acquisition 
performance.  This research focuses on the TMT, their retention, the particular 
characteristics of the TMT (their networks, knowledge, dynamic capability), these 
characteristics moderated by both acquisition type and competitive dynamics, and their 
value to the firm to help explain the variation in post acquisition success of the acquired 
firm.  The proposed view posits that the TMT is a valuable resource and firms now prefer 
to acquire successful firms with successful TMTs.  This unique viewpoint is 
contradictory of the large body of market for corporate control literature which has a 
foundation of Agency theory.  The model extends the Upper Echelon theory and 
integrates the resource based view plus its component pieces (the knowledge based view 
and the dynamic capabilities perspective) to reconceptualize the TMT as a valuable 
component of a firm.    
Another key element of this dissertation is that it differs from previous research in 
that it examines which characteristics of the TMT are important to acquisition 
performance moderated by both industry specific competitive dynamics and type of 
acquisition.  This research should help determine whether it is appropriate to 
conceptualize the top management team (via the resource based view) as a valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resource that attracts acquiring firms.  
The following model is tested.  The model illustrates that the target firm’s TMT 
may or may not (competing arguments) wish to be retained.  The other direct effect is 
whether the retention of the TMT will or will not (competing arguments) affect post 
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acquisition performance.  Post acquisition performance consists of employee satisfaction, 
goal attainment, and perceived financial performance, which represent financial and non-
financial outcomes.  The TMT characteristics of network, knowledge and dynamic 
capability will positively affect post acquisition performance moderated by both the 
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4.5.3 Control Variable: Ownership of Target Firm
4.6 Analysis
4.0 Overview: 
This chapter describes the sample and key informant issues which affect the 
survey design.  Also it discusses the pre-testing, the sample, and how we collected the 
data.  We then discuss the variables in detail and their measurement.  The questionnaire is 
introduced and the items illustrated.  Finally, we explain our analysis procedure and the 
reasons for utilizing regression for this research.
4.1 Sample and Key Informant Issues and Their Effects on Survey Design
Several elements must be considered before conducting empirical tests on the 
proposed relationships in our model. The model itself does not lend itself to a study using 
secondary data. Due to the highly perceptual nature of data related to post- and pre-
acquisition performance and also in regard to the specific TMT characteristics, a survey 
68
method of collecting data is most appropriate. Also, for most firms, acquisition financial 
performance information is usually consolidated if reported publicly, so specific 
acquisition performance data would not be available.  As such, to ascertain post-
acquisition performance of the acquired firm, perceptual data was required. 
Our research must rely upon key informants, which is appropriate as the content 
of our inquiry is such that complete or in-depth information cannot be expected from 
respondents chosen statistically at random from any organization (Kumar, Stern and 
Anderson, 1993).  Key informant methodology has some significant drawbacks, that of 
informant bias and random error.  Since our sample will use key informants that occupy 
roles that make them knowledgeable about the issues being researched and were able and 
willing to communicate with the researcher, we suggest that key informant bias is not of a 
major consideration (Campbell, 1955).  Also, insider informants have been used 
extensively in strategy research (e.g. Frederickson, 1984).
The focus of this study will be top level M&A managers’ whose views may 
systematically vary from those of second/third-level M&A personnel due to their varying 
organizational roles (Phillips, 1981; Seidler, 1974).  Several researchers have advocated 
querying multiple informants to increase the reliability and validity of reports (Bagozzi, 
Yi and Phillips, 1991; Golden, 1992).  However, there are limitations involving multiple 
informants such as the selection problem.  The selection problem is that response errors 
are likely to be higher for participants whose roles are not closely associated with the 
phenomena under study (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Kumar, et. al., 1993).    
In this study the informants are experts on acquisitions and senior managers.  
These informants will be asked about a specific acquisition of which they participated, 
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and may be the only individual with all the pertinent data.  The size of the acquisitions, as 
noted earlier, will be smaller than in past research and most may have had only one 
manager.  Therefore attempting to acquire a second informant to question the competence 
of the responses of the original informant is not typically performed by researchers due to 
the amount of effort it frequently takes to obtain even a single organizational informant to 
discuss often delicate matters (e.g., Heide and John, 1992, Heide and Miner, 1992).
Retrospective reports in regard to perceptions have been researched (Huber and 
Power, 1985; Golden, 1992) utilizing executive’s retrospective accounts to identify firm 
strategy (Boeker, 1989; Feeser and Willard, 1990), planning processes (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1987) and strategic 
and organizational change (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Smith and Grimm, 
1987).  Other research suggests sole informants at high levels such as CEO may actually 
increase the validity, or confidence therein, in their report (Sharfman, 1998).
This method is used because in many cases key informant perceptions are the 
only way to obtain information that may otherwise be difficult to measure as is in 
acquisition research (Seidler, 1974).  Such top managers should accurately recall a past 
acquisition as 1) it is a high involvement activity both behaviorally and cognitively, and 
2) the effects of an acquisition are generally enduring and the TMT will be continuously 
reminded of its occurrence (Golden, 1992).  These are important characteristics, as our 
respondents are top managers who were both involved in pre- as well as post-acquisition 
activities and are aware of performance expectations prior to purchase as well as 
monitoring the performance post-acquisition. 
70
However, it is argued by a small number of management researchers that there are 
pitfalls associated with this technique.  The hazards suggested in using retrospective 
reports are 1) individuals may attempt to project a socially desirable image by casting a 
light of rationality upon their past decisions (Cannella and Henson, 1974; Feldman and 
March, 1981; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Tedeshi and Melburg, 1984), 2) respondents 
with good intentions may misrepresent the past as a result of the hindsight bias (Fischoff 
and Beyth, 1975) or of subconscious attempts to maintain their self-esteem (Nisbett and 
Wilson, 1977), and 3) and that individual differences will affect the likelihood to 
accurately recall past events (Huber and Power, 1985).
However more recent research suggests that retrospective reports are accurate and 
an effective technique for management research (Golden, 1992).  Even more encouraging 
is that the research suggests that top management who have MBA degrees may be 
expected to more accurately recall past strategy than those without such education lends 
credibility to this study, as nearly all of the respondents will have MBAs (cf. Huber and 
Power, 1985; O’Reilly, 1977).  Moderate amounts of elapsed time do not affect the 
stability of retrospective reports and that researchers can have a fairly high level of 
confidence in the temporal stability retrospective reports (Huber and Power, 1985).
The present study was designed to address these issues.  For example, we mailed 
surveys to only top managers and asked that they participate only if they have been 
involved in a recent acquisition.  Some managers contacted us to let us know that they 
will not be participating as they were not involved in a recent acquisition.  This sample 
focuses on key informants that occupy roles that make them knowledgeable of the 
transaction and may be the only individual with all the information that is required for the 
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survey.  Also as the survey asks for very delicate proprietary information, we have 
assured anonymity to the responders to attempt to circumvent hazards such as projecting 
a desirable imagine upon their past decisions and misrepresentation with a hindsight bias.  
As we asked the respondents to address a recent transaction, this should not affect the 
stability of the retrospective report due to the moderate amount of elapsed time.  Also 
addressing the temporal issues we asked the respondents to pay attention to the following 
directions:
Think of one recent acquisition in which you have participated and for which you 
can determine the post- acquisition performance and the performance was good.  
By recent, we mean an acquisition that occurred within the last one - two (1-2) 
years. When asked about the top management team (TMT) of the acquired firm, 
we mean those individuals from as little as three to ten people who are at the apex 
of the acquired organization and providing strategic leadership.
We included an area on the questionnaire for optional information.  We asked the 
respondent for the name of their firm and the firm they purchased.  This valuable piece of 
information has been kept “optional” to protect the confidentiality of respondents –
something that we believe is essential for a good response rate.  We hoped that the 
majority of participants would supply this information.  Unfortunately only nine 
responded and seven with both purchaser and target firm information.
4.3 Pre-Test and Application of the Instrument:
The individuals we surveyed came from an Ernst and Young database of top 
executives who have participated in Mergers and Acquisitions.  The database contained 
807 names and their related addresses, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses.  
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We initially prepared a draft questionnaire with items to test the variables. We obtained 
input on these preliminary items from an expert panel of M&A professionals from 
different industries, as well as from respected academics.  Fifteen people reviewed the 
preliminary items.  Three were from Price-Waterhouse/Coopers, 3 were international 
Mergers and acquisitions managers, 6 were top managers, and 3 were academics.  A pilot 
study was performed with a small sample of business professionals that have participated 
in acquisitions.  We administered the pilot version of the questionnaire to these M&A
professionals.  After the pilot was administered, we analyzed the data.  During this pilot 
study we had asked the participants to make suggestions in regard to confusing questions, 
or any comments in general.  We made changes in the instrument where we deemed 
necessary based on this feedback. The pilot data were not included in the final analysis.  
After the pilot study was completed we administered the instrument.  We 
contacted the individuals in the database in three waves of mailings to get as many of 
these managers as possible to participate. The initial mailing was performed on Monday 
November 3, the second on November 24, and the final mailing on December 15, 2003.
Two types of surveys were mailed in an attempt to gather data for acquisitions: 
those that did not have good performance and those that did have good performance.  We 
did this to obtain results that reflected both acquisitions that had good post-acquisition 
performance as well as those with poorer post-acquisition performance.  The two types 
(with same questions but differing directions) were randomly assigned with half of the 
sample receiving the good and the other poor performance.  Please note the survey is in 
Appendix.  Examples of questions in the survey with responses on a 5-point Likert scale 
are:  In gross revenues, about how large is your firm?, The employees of the acquired 
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organization are good workers., The acquisition has met the strategic goals we 
anticipated., The financial performance of the acquired firm is much less then 
anticipated., We retained the most valuable members of the TMT of the acquired 
organization., The acquired firm’s TMT’s network of relationships is extensive., The 
TMT of the acquired organization match internal strengths to market changes., The 
acquired firm’s TMT’s knowledge of the industry is valuable to our firm., The acquired 
firm was one of the better firms in their market.
Examples of the titles of the individuals that were sent the surveys were Vice 
Presidents (110), Senior VP (23), CEOs (24), CFOs (25), Director (49), etc.  In essence, 
these are senior managers who have been directly involved in a recent acquisition and are 
aware of the post-acquisition performance of the acquired firm.  The data base 
information was apparently old and after eliminating those that were either no longer at 
that address, “return to sender”, or their office notified us they were not longer with the 
firm, or dead, we had 610 possible respondents.  This figure may not be accurate 
however, and could be significantly lower.  The tenure of upper managers can be as short 
as 3-5 years and many of the questionnaires could have been thrown away as the 
potential respondent no longer worked for the firm and we were not notified.  Regardless, 
based upon this information, we received a sample of 102 responses for a response rate of 
17%.  Response rate for surveys of senior management is typically very low, so we were 
pleased with the number of responses obtained as it is consistent with similar surveys (cf. 
Weaver, Travino, Cochrane 1999; Hambrick, Geletkancyz, & Fredrickson, 1993).  Chart 
4.1 illustrates the wide variety of industries that were represented in the data, therefore 
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the data is not subject to being biased from having been collected in only a few industries 
and may be more generalizable.
4.4 Measures:
The dependant variable is post acquisition performance measured with financial, 
strategic and employee indicators.  The independent variables are Retention of the TMT, 
the TMT characteristics of Network, Knowledge and Dynamic Capability, Industry 
Competitive Environment, Acquisition Type, and Pre-Acquisition Performance.  The 
control variables are Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of the Target Firm.
4.4.1  Dependent Variable: Post Acquisition Performance 
The dependant variable is the degree of failure or success of the acquisition based 
upon Mergers and Acquisition Experts’ opinions (see discussion of the sample).  There 
appears little agreement on the best way to measure acquisition success, or at what point 
in the process a measure should be taken (Hogan and Overmyer-Day, 1994).  The results 
of acquisitions are difficult to assess accurately, both in terms of the indices used and the 
appropriate time span over which to judge acquisition performance (Lubatkin, 1983; 
1987).  Prior acquisition research has focused on such variables such as potential growth 
rate and target evaluation (Baker, Miller and Ramsperger, 1981), communication 
(Schweiger and Denisi, 1991; Sinetar, 1981), merger goals (Cartwright and Cooper, 
1992; Kitching, 1967), organizational culture fit (Buono, Bowditch and Lewis, 1995; 
Marks and Mirvis 1992, 2000), and retaining the TMT (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; 
Hayes and Hoag, 1974).  
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However, financial analyses frequently fail to recognize that the acquisition is an 
important human as well as financial activity, or a combination of both.  In focusing only 
on financial results such as income statement, ratios, and balance sheet issues, the role of 
people, knowledge gained, or other intangible goals are often overlooked (Hunt, 1987; 
Levinson, 1970; Kitching, 1967).  Acquisition decisions and negotiations still typically 
center on financial results and rarely involve the personnel function (Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1992).
Other acquisition research has focused on the effect of purchase premiums 
(Sirower, 1997), the importance of the overall integration process (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991), strategy (Bettis, 1982), and relatedness (Christiansen and Montgomery, 
1981; Rumelt, 1982).  It appears much of the previous research attempts to develop a 
theoretical foundation which establishes a causal relationship for the prediction of 
success/failure.  However, the development of causal relationships is still inconclusive.  
Use of overall firm-level accounting measures as measures of acquisition performance 
has many limitations as short-term measures are imperfect and may not depict the true 
value of the acquisition (Porter, 1987).  Typically acquisitions are accounted for only 
internally where the information is proprietary. Further acquisition performance often is 
consolidated into total performance and may be too small by itself to make a material 
difference in overall firm performance.  Also managers have discretion as to the 
accounting methods utilized and allocation procedures (e.g. overhead, indirect costs, 
etc.), which may inflate the costs or the performance of the acquisition.  The accounting 
method has typically a short-term bias in which accounting practices materially can affect 
such as the setting-up of accruals, writing off goodwill, eliminating costs from other 
76
divisions through allocation, etc.  The largest flaw in utilizing accounting measures, 
especially in the new knowledge economy, is the valuation of intangible assets and 
liabilities.  A firm’s intangible resources and capabilities are productive assets that are 
difficult to observe, describe, and value but that nevertheless can have a significant 
impact of a firm’s performance.  Researchers have noted that the impacts of these 
limitations are great and the magnitude for researcher misrepresentation is significant 
(Fischer and McGowan, 1983; Ijiri and Kelly, 1980; Solomon, 1985; Pare, 1993).
Other ways to measure performance include Tobin’s q, stock price, Jensen’s 
alpha, the Treynor index, Sharpe’s measure, net cash flow, and the capital asset pricing 
model (CAP-M), to name a few.  However our research focuses not so much on the 
performance of the firm in total, but rather for the acquisition in specific, given the 
research questions directed toward the effects of the TMT on the acquisition’s 
performance.  Although the other measures have their place and import in overall 
performance research, they will not assist in this research.    Also, not all authors believe 
that executive competence is easily inferred from observable performance indicators 
(Lipton, 1985; Lowenstein, 1983; Herman and Lowenstein, 1988).  Finally, in light of 
recent marketplace events (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, etc.), accounting measures may not 
accurately reflect the acquisition performance of a firm under any circumstance. 
In this study, Mergers and Acquisition Expert Managers were asked to evaluate 
the post-acquisition performance of the acquisition.  Organizational performance has 
been criticized in the past for not actually measuring what the researcher is attempting to 
measure (March and Sutton, 1997).  For example, stock price has been used as a measure 
of organizational performance.  Though shareholder wealth creation is important, often 
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stock-price growth may be systematic and not be causal from acquisition performance.  
Also, non-substantial acquisition failure or success may not affect a large organization’s 
stock price, but still may be of strategic importance.  Due to our recent ability to use 
robust statistical techniques in management research, measures have been developed that 
combine performance ratios and other measures that accurately define organizational 
performance (Hoskisson, et. al., 1994; Hitt, et. al., 1996).  Unfortunately, these measures 
cannot be used in this study, as individual acquisition financial performance results are 
not public information and may not reflect the acquisition performance anticipated by the 
purchasing organization.
The rationale for measuring acquisition level results versus organizational level 
indicators is that the TMT of the acquisition is the focus of this research.  As such, 
though the acquisition itself is an organizational phenomenon, we focus on acquisition 
performance as it is more closely linked to the performance and importance of TMT.  
Although this choice necessarily introduces a certain amount of subjectivity into these 
measures, Dess and Robinson (1984) argued in favor of the acceptability of subjective 
measures in situations such as these.  It should be noted that we went to great lengths to 
make the measurement of acquisition performance as objective as possible (see 
discussion below).  Researchers are advocating a multi-level approach to the study of 
organizations as organizations are increasingly differentiated both vertically and 
horizontally giving rise to the need for research that is both cross-level and cross-unit 
(Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981).  The issue of organizational level is important, as 
most phenomena in and about organizations are intrinsically mixed-level (Rousseau, 
1985).  The degrees of inclusion may contribute to the strength of the cross-level 
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relations as the more included is an entity in a higher level unit, the stronger any cross-
level relationship should be (Rousseau, 1985).  As previously argued, the TMT is focal to 
the acquired firm and is highly “inclusive” so would be an appropriate unit for examining 
a cross-level relationship.
In the case of acquisition performance, unless we are given access to raw 
company data, there would have been no way to measure the performance of the 
acquisition with complete objectivity.  Moreover, some of the outcomes are purely 
perceptual (e.g. degree of goal attainment).  Finally, the approach to measurement we use 
allows for a common framework for assessing acquisition performance for the different 
TMT related constructs.  Taking all these factors into consideration, previous research 
(e.g., Dess and Robinson, 1984; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Youndt, Snell, Dean and 
Lepak, 1996; Lau and Ngo, 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter and Thompson, 1994) has 
considered this perceptual approach a useful if imperfect answer to a very complex 
problem.
In strategy, the disposition of HRM and the TMT’s actions are very difficult to 
assess and it is often impossible to assess the degree of unobservability of an 
unobservable (Godfrey and Hill, 1995).  Acquisition outcomes were measured 
perceptually.  Problems with managers’ perceptions of acquisition performance could 
include social desirability (Ganster, Hennessey and Luthans, 1983), self-report bias, and 
hubris.    Self reported measures are commonly used, especially in the strategic human 
resource management area (c.f. Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Youndt, Snell, Dean and 
Lepak. 1996).  Although there is the danger of self-reported bias, research has found that 
79
measures of perceived performance correlated positively with objective measures of 
organization performance (Lau and Ngo, 2001).  
Three key areas of acquisition performance are covered in the present study:  
employee satisfaction, goal attainment, and perceived financial acquisition performance. 
These three measures represent financial and non-financial outcomes and a comparative 
method is more effective in eliciting responses than asking respondents directly to 
provide exact numbers for acquisition performance (such as dollar amount of sales, 
market share, etc.) (Lau and Ngo, 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter and Thompson, 
1994).  (See scale Appendix A – page 3 “Current Performance”).  The present scale was 
developed by utilizing pre-existing measures developed by Lau and Ngo (2001) and 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) and adapting them through suggestions from our expert 
panel plus through pre-testing.
The list of items to measure post-acquisition performance are: The employees of 
the acquired organization are good workers, The acquisition has met the strategic goals 
we set, The Acquisition’s net profit is smaller than anticipated, The price we paid for the 
acquisition was valued too high relative to the benefits received, The acquisition will 
meet expected strategic goals, Most of the acquired firm’s employees do not meet our 
standards, The Acquired Firm fits into our overall strategy, Our organization is pleased 
with the talent of the acquired organization’s employees, The valuation of the acquisition 
represented its true worth, and The financial performance of the acquired firm is much 
less than anticipated.  A Likert-type scale of 5 (strongly agree), 4 (agree), 3 (neither agree 
nor disagree), 2 (disagree), and 1 (strongly disagree) was used.
80
4.4.2 Independent Variable: Retention refers to the top management team and the extent 
to which the acquiring firm was able to retain the target TMT.  Retention was measured 
in two ways: 1) defined as a proportion of executives that were retained, similar to
Cannella and Hambrick (1993), and 2) additionally the perceived volume of valuable 
executives retained.  As suggested by pre-testing responses and from the expert panel, 
reviewing the sheer number of executives retained for small to medium sized firms does 
not provide a full picture. Although we argue the TMT is valuable it is also true that there 
are also those individuals in smaller firms that may be relatives with an executive title (or 
similar situations), but of no value.  Therefore we explore both, the number of executives 
retained, and whether the valuable executives were retained.  Items explored whether: 
most members of the TMT of the acquired organization were retained, and whether most 
of the TMT members of the acquisition remained with the organization after purchase.  
(See scale Appendix A – page 3 “Top Management Retention”).  There is no pre-existing 
scale to utilize as to TMT retention after acquisition.  However we utilized previous 
literature to develop the items.  We attempted to see if cumulatively whether a proportion 
of the TMT was retained (Walsh, 1988).  We also asked the degree to which the valuable 
members of the TMT either stayed with the firm or exited (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Krug 
and Hegarty, 1997).  We also will attempt to delineate between the loss of TMT that may 
have been of value and those that were not, as not all members of the TMT may be of 
value for the goal attainment of the acquiring firm (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).
4.4.3 Independent Variable: Network:  This independent variable refers to the internal 
and external network of relationships of the target firm TMT.  A network of firm 
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relationships and shared values, with relationships defined as: non-hierarchical/long-term 
commitments, multiple roles and responsibilities, mutuality, and affiliational sentiments, 
is developed by the TMT.  The network organization is dense, has reciprocity of ties, and 
shared value system defining membership roles and responsibilities that the TMT has 
developed over time.  Also the TMT has developed a network of internal relationships 
that facilitate the effective operation of the firm.  Explicit knowledge that is not embodied 
in specific products may not be efficiently transferred, however the TMT’s alliances and 
networks of these alliances may be well suited to the transfer and integration of this 
knowledge (Liebeskind, et. al., 1996).  Our items (See scale Appendix A – page 4 “Top 
Management Team Characteristics” lines 2, 5, 8, and 11) examined whether the external 
networks are valuable as a TMT capability, as these external network alliances bring new 
resources into the firm from external sources (Gulati, 1999; Capron, et. al., 1998; Zollo 
and Singh, 1998). The items also examined the value of the internal networks as the 
personal relationships of the members developed over time, create value for the firms 
(Hakansson and Johanson, 1988).
4.4.4 Independent Variable: Knowledge:  This independent variable is in regard to the 
industry, market and firm-specific knowledge of the target TMT.  We are exploring 
whether the TMT knowledge will assist in the development of the new goals and role the 
acquisition will perform, as the TMT is an integral part of the value of the acquisition by 
developing its strategy, organization, and leadership.  The retention of the top 
management team due to their knowledge base might well improve/maintain the expected 
performance of the acquired organization.  The items (See scale Appendix A – page 4 
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“Top Management Team Characteristics” lines 3, 6, 9 and 12) will explore the TMT’s 
knowledge, as knowledge has emerged as the most strategically significant resource of 
the organization (Grant, 1996; Quinn, 1992).  As knowledge is information laden with 
experience, truth, judgment, intuition, and values; a unique combination that allows 
individuals and organizations to assess new situations and manage change the items will 
assess the importance of this knowledge in regard to acquisitions (Huseman and 
Goodman, 1999).  Knowledge and the competencies built upon this platform are the main 
factors in determining an organization’s current and future value so the items will attempt 
to ascertain as to how valuable the knowledge of the TMT was to the value of the 
acquisition (Drucker, 1993; Thurow, 1999; Grant, 1996; Hamel, 2000)
4.4.5 Independent Variable: Dynamic Capability: This independent variable refers to 
the dynamic capability of the target firm TMT.  Does the TMT have the ability to adapt 
to new situations and employ the firm’s resources to confront these issues? Dynamic 
capabilities are the organizational and strategic routines by which the TMT alter their 
resource base by acquiring and shedding resources, integrating them together and 
recombining them, to generate new value-creating strategies.  Dynamic capabilities thus 
are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die.  Research suggests that 
organizations that wish to continue success into the next century must have a TMT who, 
among other attributes, have flexibility in their strategic choices (Sharfman and Dean, 
1997).  Therefore the TMT must be flexible and integrative, and each TMT and 
individual manager have values which cause prioritization of issues within a firm (cf. 
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Sharfman, Pinkston, Sigerstad, 2000).  Decision processes of the TMT influence strategic 
decision-making effectiveness, thus they have the power to influence the success of 
strategic decisions (Dean, and Sharfman, 1996).  The items (See scale Appendix A –
page 4 “Top Management Team Characteristics” lines 1, 4, 7 and 10) attempt to ascertain 
the TMTs ability to adapt, integrate and reconfigure after acquisition both internal and 
relational resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece et al., 1997).  As dynamic capabilities 
are the antecedent organizational and strategic routines by which the TMT alter their 
resource base by acquiring and shedding resources, integrating them together and 
recombining them, to generate new value-creating strategies, the items will attempt to 
ascertain as to how well the TMT was able to perform these tasks after acquisition 
(Grant, 1996; Pisano, 1994).  “In the constantly changing business environment 
organizations are regularly called upon to adapt to environmental change” (Sharfman and 
Dean, 1997: p. 191) thus the TMT’s dynamic capabilities are valuable to a firm.  The 
dynamic capabilities perspective is focused on the strategic employment of key resources 
so the items attempt to ascertain the acquired firm’s TMT value in this process after 
acquisition (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  As decision processes have two distinct 
independent dimensions (procedural rationality and political behavior), a major strength 
in the recombination of resources may be the TMT’s ability to make choices that are both 
rational and political (Dean and Sharfman, 1993).
4.4.6 Independent Variable: Competitive Dynamics: In emphasizing how an 
organization develops its strategy, classifications of the competitive environment have 
been developed based upon pricing patterns over time (Klepper and Grady, 1990). 
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Environmental instability plays an important role in influencing decision effectiveness 
(Dean and Sharfman, 1996).  Although most researchers agree that the concept of 
industry competitive dynamics is composed of multiple dimensions (Boyd, 1995) three 
general dimensions are typically utilized: munificence, dynamism and complexity 
(Bluedorn, 1993; Dess and Beard, 1984; Aldrich, 1979).  We have utilized these 
dimensions as put forth by Dess and Beard (1984), paralleling other strategic literature 
(Keats and Hitt, 1988; Lawless and Finch, 1989; Boyd, 1995; Goll and Rasheed, 1997; Li 
and Simerly, 1998; Simerly and Li, 2000).  We also asked the managers to identify the 
industry they are in (e.g. Biotech, high-tech, transportation, etc.)(See scale Appendix A –
page 1). 
Munificence is the capability or the ability of the environment to sustain growth.  
Dynamism is the stability or instability and the rate or degree of environmental change.  
Complexity is the concentration or dispersion and the heterogeneity and/or range of the 
organization’s activities in the industry environment (Dess and Beard, 1984).
Munificence was calculated using a five-year growth in net sales for each industry 
(1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002).  Using annual figures across all firms in each 
relevant industry, the natural logarithms were utilized in a time series approach from 
Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys (11-13-2003).  Time served as the independent 
variable.  The growth measure of each was the antilog of the regression slope coefficient.  
The result is a smoothed measure of the average growth rate over the period.  Instability 
reflected five year patterns of instability in the dominant industry.  The measures were 
antilogs of the standard error of each regression slope coefficient from the growth 
equations described in the munificence measure.  Thus to be consistent with the 
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arguments of Dess and Beard (1984) and Tosi, Aldag and Storey (1973) the indicators 
capture true discontinuities in the task environment and allow similar scores for task 
environments that present similar patterns but at different base levels of magnitude.  The 
complexity measure was based on Grossack’s (1965) index of environment 
concentration.  It may be thought of an index of a trend toward or away from dominance 
by large firms in a task environment.  It is a regression of terminal year market shares of 
all firms in a given industry upon their shares in the initial year.  The resulting regression 
coefficient suggests monopoly type power within the industry.  Erosion may be due to the 
growth of smaller firms, the entrance of new firms, or some combination of factors 
(Keats and Hitt, 1988).   The three measures were then averaged.  For example, in the 
chemicals industry the munificence was 1.007327, the volatility standard error was 
.063962 and the complexity was .618 for an industry competitive dynamic environment 
measure of .08964, or a mild competitive dynamic environment.  The software industry 
had the munificence was 1.09622, the volatility standard error was 1.06715 and the 
complexity was 1.286 for an industry competitive environment measure of 1.149, or 
indicating a more intensely competitively dynamic environment
4.4.7 Independent Variable: Acquisition Type: It has been argued that managers are 
aware of the industry they are in, the segment, and the true similarity among their 
business units (Hoskisson, et. al., 1993). We will assess acquisition type in three ways: 
First we ask the managers what industry they are in and what type of acquisition it was.  
We can compare the responses to ascertain industry similarity.  Second, we specifically 
ask the respondents utilizing the following categories: 1) A horizontal acquisition, two 
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organizations in the same industry (competitors) or combination between organizations 
offering complimentary products of service (ex. a wireless service firm acquired by a 
local and long distance services firm), 2) The acquisition of an unrelated organization.  
Not in our industry. 3) Forward vertical acquisition, one organization is acquiring another 
within their supply chain.  For example, a manufacturer purchasing an organization 
forward in their supply chain like a distributor. and 4) A backward vertical acquisition, 
one organization is acquiring another within their supply chain.  For example, a 
manufacturer purchasing an organization backward in their chain like a supplier.  Third, 
we ask a series of questions in regard to similar products, lines, competition, supplier and 
buyer interactions.  These questions (See scale Appendix A – page 2 “Type of 
Acquisition” and ‘Type of Acquisition (continued)”) also serve to analyze type of 
acquisition. Acquisition type (related, unrelated, vertical forward or backward) could not 
be used as a stand alone variable as only 9 were unrelated acquisitions, 3 were forward 
acquisitions, and 3 were backward acquisitions while 86 were related acquisitions.
4.4.8 Independent Variable: Pre-Acquisition Performance: The market for corporate 
control research suggests that acquisitions often serve as a useful external control 
mechanism for removing managers who fail to maximize firm value (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989; Martin and McConnell, 1991; Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 1993).  The 
theory for corporate control suggest that as top managers engage in self-interested 
behavior, their company’s performance is likely to increasingly diverge from its 
maximum potential (Berle and Means, 1932; Manne, 1965; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; and Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b).  However, the resource based view 
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has shifted the emphasis from external factors in the strategy literature to internal factors 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and Yiu, 1999) thus bringing legitimacy to the importance of 
people to organization success. Also, top managers of the target firm can be viewed as 
critical to enhancing post-acquisition performance as the TMT possesses knowledge 
critical to ongoing business operations and that their departure may heighten the level of 
disruption and uncertainty in the firm following acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 
1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Krishnan, et. al., 1997; Singh and Zollo, 1998).  
The items (See scale Appendix A – page 2 “Acquisition’s Pre-Acquisition Performance”)
used were: 1) Before acquisition, the organization was one of the better firms in their 
industry, 2) Before acquisition, the organization was underperforming in comparison to 
their competitors. 3) Before acquisition, in comparison to their competitors, the firm had 
better performance. and 4) Before acquisition, the organization was one of the poorer 
performing firms in its sector of the market.
4.5 Control Variables: We use control variables because the fact that two variables are 
related does not necessarily mean that one is a cause of the other, even if the relationship 
is statistically significant and we are willing to reject the notion that the relationship is 
due to chance.  The control variable will assist in explaining whether any of these four 
possible patterns that can result when the control variable is introduced into the 
relationship amongst the independent and dependent variables.  1) Explanation.  The 
relationship may be spurious, that is, the independent and dependent variables may be 
related, not because either one affects the other, but because both are dependent on some 
third variable.  Controlling for the third variable will cause the original relationship to 
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disappear. 2) Interpretation.  The relationship may be indirect, that is, the independent 
variable affects a third variable which in turn affects the dependent variable.  The third 
variable is said to interpret the relationship.  As with a spurious relationship, controlling 
for the third variable will cause the original relationship to disappear. 3) Specification.
The nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables will 
depend on the value of a third variable.  Controlling for the third variable helps us to 
specify the nature of the relationship. 4) Replication.  Controlling for a third variable 
leaves the original explanation unaffected.  This does not necessarily mean that the 
independent variable is a cause of the dependent variable (there are other variables we 
haven’t controlled for yet), but at least it remains a possibility.  We have identified three 
control variables from the strategy literature that may have affect the relationship 
between our independent and dependant variables: Size, Type of Purchase and 
Ownership of Target Firm.
4.5.1 Control Variable: Size: Size differences between acquiring and acquired firm may 
influence acquisition performance (Kusewitt, 1985).  Increases in organizational size add 
complexity with its attendant increases in structural elaboration and formalized systems 
for planning, control, and resource allocation (Quinn and Cameron, 1983).  As a result, 
increases in organizational size can create progressively stronger resistance to 
fundamental change (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) yet large organizations generally 
have more decentralized decision-making authority (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971).  We 
use size as a control variable in regard to TMT, because their value will depend upon the 
individual characteristics and their value.  For example, some researchers suggest that the 
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smaller an acquired firm relative to an acquiring firm, the greater an acquired executive’s 
propensity of depart (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993).  However, if the purchase was due 
to the TMT’s knowledge of the industry or product, dynamic capabilities to evolve the 
firm in response to changing markets, or due to their internal or external network of 
relationships such as distributors or customers, then the acquiring firm will try to retain 
the TMT regardless of the target’s size.  Also, size may also contribute to the opposite 
results of Hambrick and Cannella’s (1993) findings, due to hubris (Roll, 1986), empire 
building (Mueller, 1969), or parent arrogance (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986) where there is 
just not enough room at the top for two TMTs when two large firms are combined.  In 
essence, we follow Kimberly’s (1976) advice that size, as a variable is too general to 
permit its relation to organizations to explain phenomena accurately.  As in other 
acquisition literature, size was calculated by dividing the sales of the acquired firm before 
acquisition by the sales of the acquiring firm (Hambrick and Canella, 1993). (See scale 
Appendix A – page 1  Items 3 and 4)
4.5.2 Control Variable: Type of Purchase:  Simplistically, firms can be purchased with 
stock, cash, or a combination of both.  From the acquirer’s perspective, they can use their 
cash holdings, increase their debt by borrowing, sell more equity through shares of stock, 
or a combination of these with managerial ramifications for each.  However, as this 
research’s focus is on the target firm’s TMT, their retention and value to post-acquisition 
performance, we are concerned with what the target firm’s receives and in what form.  
For example, a cash purchase may unduly enrich the target firm TMT (assuming they are 
stock holders) who may then wish to exit the situation while a stock purchase may 
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encourage the target TMT to continue with the association.  The type of purchase may 
also affect the subsequent acquisition performance due to TMT motivational issues.  
Also, the type of purchase may also reflect the value of the TMT characteristics to the 
acquirer as requiring the use of cash versus stock.  A very valuable TMT may command a 
cash purchase from the acquirer.  Contrarily, the stockholders of a firm that is 
undervalued due to a poorly performing TMT may accept stock as compensation due to 
the changing of hands to a competent management team in accordance with the market 
for corporate control.  We asked the survey participants whether the firm was bought 
utilizing cash, stock, debt, or a combination thereof and if a combination, what 
percentage of each method. (See scale Appendix A – page 1 items 8 and 9)
4.5.3 Control Variable: Ownership of Target Firm: The target firm may be privately 
owned, publicly owned with dispersed stockholders, or publicly owned with few majority 
stockholders.  Privately owned firms will typically also be managed by an owner who is 
also a member of the TMT.  Purchasing a privately owned firm may / may not suggest 
that the owner is either retiring or going to pursue other interests. In agreement with the 
RBV, the owner may only be seeking resources from the acquiring firm in which to 
continue and be more successful.  A publicly owned firm with diverse investors will be 
managed by a TMT of experts.  The market for corporate control would suggest that the 
firm might be underperforming by these TMT whose characteristics are not valuable to 
the purchasing firm.  Contrarily, these very same experts may be needed to facilitate post-
acquisition performance.  We asked whether the acquired firm was a spin-off from 
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another firm, privately owned, public firm with few majority holders, or a public firm 
with dispersed ownership. (See scale Appendix A – page 1 item 6)
4.6 Analysis 
Sample size has a direct and sizable impact on power.  Power in multiple 
regression refers to the probability of detecting as statistically significant a specific level 
of R-squared or a regression coefficient at a specified significance level for a specific 
sample size.  In addition to its role in determining statistical power, sample size also 
affects the generalizability of the results by the ratio of observations to independent 
variables.  A general rule for generalizability is that the ratio should never fall below 5 to 
1, meaning that there should be five observations for each independent variable in the 
variate.  Although the minimum level is 5 to 1, the desired level is typically between 15 
to 20 observations for each independent variable to obtain generalizability (Hair, et. al., 
1998).  As we have a sample of 102, our study exceeds these conditions.  We never have 
more than 5 variables in an equation.
We used the multiple regression technique as our analysis method because 
besides prediction, multiple regression provides a means of objectively assessing the 
degree and character of the relationship between dependent and independent variables by 
forming the regression variate (a linear combination of the independent variables that best 
predicts the dependant variable).  Another powerful feature of the multiple regression 
technique is that moderator effects can be estimated.  The moderator effect is represented 
by a term similar to the polynomials where the moderator term is a compound variable.  
To determine whether the moderator effect is significant, the researcher first estimates the 
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original (unmoderated) equation and then estimates the moderated relationship. The 
independent variables, in addition to their collective prediction of the dependant variable, 
may also be considered for their individual contribution to the regression variate and its 
predictions.  Interpretation of the regression variate may rely on any of three 
perspectives: the importance of the independent variables, the types of relationships 
found, or the interrelationships among the independent variables.
The most direct interpretation of the regression variate is a determination of the 
relative importance of each independent variable in the prediction of the dependent 
variable.  The selection of the independent variables is based on their theoretical 
relationships to the dependent variable.  Regression analysis then provides a means of 
objectively assessing the magnitude and direction (positive or negative) of each 
independent variables relationship.  The character of multiple regression is the 
simultaneous assessment of relationships between each independent variable and the 
dependent measure.  In making this simultaneous assessment, the relative importance of 
each independent variable is determined.
In addition to assessing the importance of each variable, multiple regression also 
affords the researcher a means of assessing the nature of the relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable.  The assumed relationship is a linear 
association based on the correlations among the independent variables and the dependent 
measure.  Transformations for additional variables are also available to assess whether 
other types of relationships exist, particularly curvilinear relationships.   This flexibility 
ensures that the researcher may examine the true nature of the relationship beyond the 
assumed linear relationship.
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Finally, multiple regression provides insight into the relationships among 
independent variables in their prediction of the dependent measure.  These 
interrelationships are important for two reasons.  First, correlation among the independent 
variables may make some variables redundant in the predictive effort.  As such, they are 
not needed to produce the optimal prediction.  This does not reflect their individual 
relationships with the dependent variable but instead indicates that in a multivariate 
context, they are not needed if another set of independent variables explaining this 
variance is employed.  The researcher must guard against determining the importance of 
independent variables based solely on the derived variate, because relationships among 
their independent variables may mask relationships that are not needed for predictive 
purposes but represent substantive findings none-the-less.  The interrelationships among 
variables can extend not only to their predictive power but also to interrelationships 
among their estimated effects.  This is best seen when the effect of one independent 
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5.6 Summary:
5.0 Introduction:
This chapter discusses the characteristics of the variables (e.g., correlations, 
descriptives), the validity and reliability analysis of both the measures and the design and 
how the variables are used in the various stages of the hypothesis testing. Recall that the 
raw input data used discusses the relationships between the TMT, their characteristics, 
pre-acquisition performance, and post-acquisition performance controlled for by size, 
type of purchase and ownership of target firm. The hypotheses will be restated in terms of 
what each is designed to test. The graphical analysis results are referenced if the reader 
wishes to see the summary statistical support from the tables. Noteworthy conclusions 
from the tests are highlighted but their discussion is reserved for the next chapter. Results 
of statistical tests are presented along with any relevant details about the tests used; 
however the implications of the findings are discussed in chapter six.
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5.1  Data descriptives
The correlations among the variables are presented in Table 5.1.  Review of the 
correlation table suggested relationships amongst the variables.  We explore these 
relationships in greater detail through hypothesis testing.  To assess multivariate and 
univariate normality analyses of skewness, kurtosis, and outliers were performed using 
Q-Q (P-P) plots and standard tests for each indicator.  The results of these tests are 
presented in Table 5.2.  Review of the skewness and kurtosis statistics suggest that no 
transformations were required as all the skewness and kurtosis numbers fall below 1.96 
which corresponds to a .05 error level (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998).  We 
tested all hypotheses with regression using SPSS version number 12.0.  
5.2 Common Method Variance:
We utilized Harman’s one factor test to assess the degree of common method 
variance due to the fact that the data all came from the same survey. This technique uses 
a statistical procedure in an attempt to isolate the covariance due the fact that the same 
general method (i.e. the same instrument) (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).  The technique 
requires that all variables of interest are entered into a factor analysis and the results of 
the unrotated factor solution are examined to determine the number of factors that are 
required to account for the variance in the variables (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).  The 
result of this procedure is in Tables 5.3 and 5.3.1, and suggests that a single factor did not 
emerge nor one general factor account for the majority of covariance (e.g. Greene and 
Organ, 1973; Jermier and Schriesheim, 1978; Podsakoff, Todor, Grover and Huber, 
1984).
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5.3  Non-response bias
Managers that are familiar with mergers and acquisitions are typically TMT who 
may not readily respond to surveys.  We used extrapolation methods to examine non-
response bias.  Extrapolation methods are based on the assumption that subjects who 
respond less readily (late responders) are more like non-respondents than are early 
responders.  The most common type of extrapolation is carried over successive waves of 
a questionnaire (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).  Wave analysis employing MANOVA 
was used to check for non-response bias examining selected scale items from each 
construct (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).  Each of the major survey waves was counted 
as a separate wave, for a total of three waves. Wave analysis, in the form of MANOVA, 
was performed covering all relevant variables and found no significant differences 
between each wave that would indicate the possibility of non-response bias. The result of 
this procedure is in Tables 5.4.1 to 5.4.3.
5.4   Scale development
Construct validity refers to the degree to which a construct corresponds to what its 
dimensions are intended to measure (Cronbach and Meehl 1955; Peter 1981). Thus, a 
researcher must be sure that measures/items are convergent (correlate with the other 
items within the construct) and are discriminant (do not correlate with items in another 
construct) (Campbell and Fisk 1959). We performed exploratory factor analysis to see if 
a unidimensional solution came out of the exploratory analysis.  This analysis assists 
researchers in inferring unidimensionality and is helpful in showing convergence. For 
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each of our independent and dependent variables we reviewed the results (Tables 5.5.1 to 
5.10.4) and found that each construct’s items were all significantly correlated (p < .001) 
in accordance with the Bartlett test of sphericity.  Another measure, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA), for each of the variables, suggested high 
intercorrelation amongst the variables.  The MSA index ranges from 0-1, reaching 1when 
each variable is perfectly predicted without error by the other variables.  Post-Acquisition 
Performance had an MSA of .895, Retention .869, TMT Dynamic Capability .823, TMT 
Knowledge .756, TMT Network, .836, and Pre-Acquisition Performance .786.  The 
Cronbach alpha’s (Tables 5.5.5, 5.6.5, 5.7.5, 5.8.5, 5.9.5, an 5.10.5) were also strong: 
Post-Acquisition Performance had an alpha of .938, Retention .966, TMT Dynamic 
Capability .931, TMT Knowledge .756, TMT Network, .929, and Pre-Acquisition 
Performance .873. Cronbach’s alpha is used to examine the internal consistency of a 
scale, or how well a set of items measures a single unidimensional construct. The items 
should all measure the same thing, so they should be correlated with one another. If the 
items making up the score are all identical and so perfectly correlated, all the si2 will be 
equal and sT2 = k2 si2, so that si2/sT2 = 1/k and = 1. On the other hand, if the items are 
all independent, then sT2 = si2 and = 0. Thus  will be 1 if the items are all the same 
and 0 if none is related to another. 
5.5a  Hypothesis H1
H1:  The greater the pre-acquisition performance of the acquired firm, the more 
likely the TMT of the acquired firm will be retained.
Hypothesis H1 explores the relationship between Target firm Pre-acquisition 
Performance and TMT retention.  The independent variable was Target firm Pre-
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acquisition Performance with TMT retention as the dependant variable while controlling 
variables for Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm (Table 5.11).  Model 
1, which is the relationship between TMT Retention and the control variables Size, Type 
of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p < .873 and an F-value 
of .234 (Table 5.11.2).  The hierarchal linear regression indicated that the addition of Pre-
acquisition Performance to the control variables proved to be significant at p < .001
(Table 5.11.2) with an F-value of 7.54.  The R-square was .237 with an adjusted R-square 
of .205 with standard error at 1.7490 (Table 5.11.1).  Review of the coefficients suggest 
that the variable Pre-acquisition Performance is significant at p < .001 with at 
standardized t-coefficient of 5.403 and Beta at .484 (Table 5.11.3).  Therefore Hypothesis 
H1 is supported.
5.5b  Hypotheses H2a and H2b
H2a:  There is a positive relationship between post acquisition performance of the 
acquired firm and degree of retention of the top management team of the acquired 
organization.
H2b: There is a negative relationship between post acquisition performance of 
the acquired firm and degree of retention of the top management team of the 
acquired organization.
We next explored the relationship between TMT Retention and Post-Acquisition 
Performance.  The independent variable was Retention, the dependent variable was Post-
Acquisition Performance, controlling for Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of 
Target Firm (Table 5.12).   Model 1, which is the relationship between Post-Acquisition 
Performance and the control variables Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target 
Firm, was not significant at p < .115 and an F-value of 2.029 (Table 5.12.2).  The 
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hierarchal linear regression indicated that the addition of TMT Retention to the control 
variables proved to be significant at p < .001 (Table 5.12.2) with an F-value of 7.044.  
The R-square was .225 with an adjusted R-square of .193 with standard error at 1.2801 
(Table 5.12.1).  Review of the coefficients suggest that the variable Pre-acquisition 
Performance is significant at p < .001 with at standardized t-coefficient of 4.567 and Beta 
at .410 (Table 5.12.3).  Therefore Hypothesis H2a is supported and H2b is not supported.
5.5c  Hypothesis H3
H3 There is a positive relationship between the quality of acquired firm TMT’s 
networks and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
The regression equation for H3 included the TMT Network as the independent 
variable Post-Acquisition Performance as the dependent variable, and Size, Type of 
Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm as the control variables (Table 5.13).   Model 1, 
which is the relationship between Post-Acquisition Performance and the control variables 
Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p < .115 and 
an F-value of 2.029 (Table 5.13.2).  The hierarchal linear regression indicated that the 
addition of the TMT Network variables to the control variables proved to be significant at 
p < .001 (Table 5.13.2) with an F-value of 19.809.  The R-square was .450 with an 
adjusted R-square of .427 with standard error at 1.07887 (Table 5.13.1).  Review of the 
coefficients suggest that the variable Pre-acquisition Performance is significant at p < 
.001 with at standardized t-coefficient of 8.302 and Beta at .627 (Table 5.13.3). Therefore 
Hypothesis H3 is supported.
5.5d  Hypothesis H4
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H4 There is a positive relationship between the quality of the acquired firm 
TMT’s knowledge and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
The regression equation for H4 included the TMT Knowledge as the independent 
variable Post-Acquisition Performance as the dependent variable, and Size, Type of 
Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm as the control variables (Table 5.14).  Model 1, 
which is the relationship between Post-Acquisition Performance and the control variables 
Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p < .115 and 
an F-value of 2.029 (Table 5.14.2).  The hierarchal linear regression indicated that the 
addition of the TMT Knowledge variable to the control variables proved to be significant 
at p < .001 (Table 5.14.2) with an F-value of 13.118.  The R-square was .351 with an 
adjusted R-square of .324 with standard error at 1.17148 (Table 5.14.1).  Review of the 
coefficients suggest that the variable Pre-acquisition Performance is significant at p < 
.001 with at standardized t-coefficient of 6.613 and Beta at .543 (Table 5.14.3). Therefore 
Hypothesis H4 is supported.
5.5e  Hypothesis H5
H5 There is a positive relationship between the quality of the acquired firm 
TMT’s dynamic capability and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
The regression equation for H5 included the TMT Dynamic Capability as the 
independent variable Post-Acquisition Performance as the dependent variable, and Size, 
Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm as the control variables (Table 5.15).  
Model 1, which is the relationship between Post-Acquisition Performance and the control 
variables Size, Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p 
< .115 and an F-value of 2.029 (Table 5.15.2).  The hierarchal linear regression indicated 
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that the addition of the TMT Dynamic Capability variable to the control variables proved 
to be significant at p < .001 (Table 5.15.2) with an F-value of 15.414.  The R-square was 
.389 with an adjusted R-square of .363 with standard error at 1.13707 (Table 5.15.1).  
Review of the coefficients suggest that the variable Pre-acquisition Performance is 
significant at p < .001 with at standardized t-coefficient of 7.237 and Beta at .580 (Table
5.15.3). Therefore Hypothesis H5 is supported.
5.5f  Hypothesis H6a 
H6a:  The competitive dynamics positively m oderates the relationship between the
quality of TMT knowledge and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm.
The regression equation for H6a included the TMT Knowledge as the 
independent variable Post-Acquisition Performance as the dependent variable, and Size, 
Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm as the control variables and competitive 
dynamics as the moderator (Table 5.16).  Model 1, which is the relationship between 
Post-Acquisition Performance and the control variables Size, Type of Purchase and 
Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p < .115 and an F-change-value of 
2.029 (Table 5.16.1).  Model 2, which is the relationship with the addition of the TMT 
Knowledge variable to the control variables proved to be significant at p < .001 (Table
5.16.1) with an F-change-value of 43.730 (see H4). However, the hierarchal linear 
regression indicated that the addition of the Competitive Dynamics moderator variable 
proved to be non-significant at p < .251 with an F-change-value of 1.401 (Table 5.16.1).  
The r-squared change was .019.  Therefore Hypothesis H6a is not supported.
5.5g  Hypothesis H6b
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H6b: The competitive dynamics positively moderates the relationship between the 
quality of TMT dynamic capabilities and post acquisition performance of the 
acquired firm.
The regression equation for H6b included the TMT Dynamic Capability as the 
independent variable Post-Acquisition Performance as the dependent variable, and Size, 
Type of Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm as the control variables and competitive 
dynamics as the moderator (Table 5.17).  Model 1, which is the relationship between 
Post-Acquisition Performance and the control variables Size, Type of Purchase and 
Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p < .115 and an F-value of 2.029 (Table 
5.17.1).  Model 2, which is the relationship with the addition of the TMT Dynamic 
Capability variable to the control variables proved to be significant at p < .001 (Table
5.17.1) with an F-change-value of 52.378 (see H5). However, the hierarchal linear 
regression indicated that the addition of the Competitive Dynamics moderator variable 
proved to be non-significant at p < .713 with an F-change-value of .339 (Table 5.17.1).  
The r-squared change was .004.  Therefore Hypothesis H6b is not supported.
5.5h  Hypotheses H6c
H6c:  The competitive dynamics positively moderates the relationship of the 
quality of TMT’s networks and post acquisition performance of the acquired firm
The regression equation for H6c included the TMT Network as the independent 
variable Post-Acquisition Performance as the dependent variable, and Size, Type of 
Purchase and Ownership of Target Firm as the control variables and competitive 
dynamics as the moderator (Table 5.18).  Model 1, which is the relationship between 
Post-Acquisition Performance and the control variables Size, Type of Purchase and 
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Ownership of Target Firm, was not significant at p < .115 and an F-value of 2.029 (Table 
5.18.1).  Model 2, which is the relationship with the addition of the TMT Network
variable to the control variables proved to be significant at p < .001 (Table 5.18.1) with 
an F-change-value of 68.930 (see H3). However, the hierarchal linear regression 
indicated that the addition of the Competitive Dynamics moderator variable proved to be 
non-significant at p < .561 with an F-change-value of .581 (Table 5.18.1).  The r-squared 
change was .007.  Therefore Hypothesis H6b is not supported.
5.6 Summary:
The results of our hierarchal linear statistical analyses offer several contributions 
to the strategic management literature in regard to acquisitions and the value of the top 
management team (TMT) of the acquired firm, TMT retention, 
TMT characteristics, and their impact to post acquisition performance.  Chapter 6 
discusses the implications of these results for both academics and practitioners, and 
suggests further research to be performed.  The results suggest significant findings in 
regard to hypothesis H1 (higher pre-acquisition performance correlates with TMT 
retention).  Hypothesis H2a which suggests that Higher TMT Retention correlates 
positively with post acquisition performance was found significant yet H2b of Lower 
TMT retention to Post-Acquisition Performance was not supported. Hypotheses H3, H4 
and H5, that of the TMT characteristics of Networks, Knowledge and Dynamic 
Capability to Post-Acquisition Performance were all found significant.  We did not find 
that Competitive Dynamics (Hypothesis H6a, H6b and H6c) to moderate TMT 
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6.0 Restatement of Research Purpose
This research carries importance for both the researcher and the 
practitioner.  From the researcher’s perspective, this research utilizes the Resource Based 
View and Upper Echelon Theory to explain the occurrence of acquisitions, as opposed to 
previous research that relied mostly on Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, and 
the Market for Corporate Control. Specifically, this research proposes that firms acquire 
other firms to capture the resources inherent in the top management team and that 
retention of that group aids post acquisition performance.   Also, this research 
methodology is different from past acquisition research as it relied on primary data from 
questionnaires on a sample of the majority of acquisitions which are smaller, versus 
secondary data from very large acquisitions.  This research also focuses on the top 
management team (TMT) of the target as a source of value with an attempt to determine 
specific characteristics that are valuable, versus previous research suggesting that the 
reason for acquisition is a poorly performing TMT that is ultimately dismissed.
There were three primary questions of interest in the presentation of the 
theoretical model representing the research problems. Those were:
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1. Is there a relationship between the retention of the TMT of the target firm after 
acquisition and post-acquisition performance of the acquired firm?
2 Is a relationship between target firm pre-acquisition performance and the retention 
of the TMT.
3. Are the TMT characteristics we have theoretically identified (network, knowledge, 
dynamic capability) correlate to post-acquisition performance of the acquired firm?
The first research question is a fundamental question in the field of strategic 
management and in the acquisitions literature.  There is an emphasis in strategic 
management currently on the Resource-based view of the firm.  In essence, this view 
suggests that a firm’s resources that are actually rare, inimitable, valuable and organized 
to exploit their value can be a source of competitive advantage.  Therefore the 
identification of resources that fulfill these criteria facilitates theory development.  If the 
TMT (as a resource) is lost, what is the effect on post-acquisition performance?  Not only 
are we interested in the relationship between retention and post-acquisition performance, 
but also the relationship if the resources are not retained.  
The second research question examines whether there is a relationship between 
target firm pre-acquisition performance and the retention of the TMT.  The argument 
offered by the market for corporate control for acquisitions literature is that the target is 
performing poorly due to an inadequate management, thus the marketplace sees an 
opportunity.  The argument continues that the poorly performing firm is bought and the 
target TMT is then fired. By addressing the above questions, this dissertation goes 
beyond the relation between post-acquisition performance and TMT retention, to 
examine the link between pre-acquisition performance and whether the TMT is retained
in small acquisitions..  
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Finally, we explore the top management characteristics as strategic assets.  One of 
the characteristics important to a TMT is the network of relationships in which the TMT 
is embedded in, both external and internal to the firm.  For example, the advice network 
that a TMT forms to acquire and share tacit knowledge throughout the organization is a 
key coordinating mechanism (Athanssiou and Nigh, 1999).  Also, the internal network 
focuses on productivity, innovation, and labor relations, while the external network will 
focus on competition, customers and new product/market opportunities (D’Aveni and 
MacMillan, 1990).  TMTs develop networks of relationships between firms and then 
maintain them.  These relationships developed are an integral part of a firm’s success, 
and are often inimitable.  The TMT has tacit knowledge in regard to strategy, 
organizational strengths and weakness, the industry, etc., which is a valuable commodity 
to the firm.  Also, the TMT develops routines that create knowledge flows throughout the 
organization.  How the TMT employs the firm’s assets, and how quickly, affects the 
success of a strategy in today’s global competition (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998b).  This 
asset employment can be called dynamic capabilities, which refer to the development of 
management capabilities and difficult-to-imitate combinations of organizational, 
functional and technological skills to gain/sustain a competitive advantage (Teece, et al., 
1997).  In essence, the three TMT characteristics are a beginning to unravel the 
particulars or value of the TMT as a valuable resource to the firm.
6.1  Theoretical Implications
Hypothesis one explores whether pre-acquisition performance is positively related 
to the retention of the TMT of the target firm and our results suggest statistical 
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significance.  Our research utilizes the resource based view and the upper echelon theory 
to attempt to identify target firm’s value in an acquisition.  The TMT leads the firm, 
directs resources, develops and implements strategy, and motivates employees.  The 
support of this hypothesis may suggest that a firm acquires another firm due to its 
resources, which have been developed by the TMT, or which may very well be the TMT.  
Therefore a firm that is performing well may be an indication that the TMT members are 
effective.  If so, then TMT retention as a group is important as in accordance with 
Simon’s (1945) idea of bounded rationality, that the creation of new knowledge, 
acquisition of existing knowledge, and storage of knowledge cannot be performed by one 
individual.  Retention of the TMT follows the knowledge based theory that suggests the 
TMT develops rules and directives to facilitate knowledge integration based upon 
specialist expertise (Grant, 1996).  Also knowledge assets remain with individual 
employees and cannot be readily transferred with the most complex tacit knowledge 
resident in the TMT.  From this argument, it would follow that the greater the pre-
acquisition performance the greater the potential value of the target firm’s TMT, thus 
retention increases.  This finding also supports the market for corporate control literature 
by suggesting that the poorer the pre-acquisition performance, the less likely the target 
TMT will be retained 
The significant findings which support Hypothesis 2a, suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between post acquisition performance of the acquired firm and the 
degree of retention of the top management team of that firm. If we consider our 
theoretical foundation that combines the Upper Echelon perspective of top management 
teams with a resource based view of them, retention of a valuable TMT should provide 
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higher post-acquisition performance (e.g. Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993).  
The Upper Echelon perspective suggests that there is a linkage between top management 
characteristics and the development of strategic assets so that the organization becomes a 
reflection of the TMT.  The resource based view argues that organizations accumulate 
and develop a bundle of specialized resources that are both tangible and intangible.  
These resources, when applied appropriately, should generate above average returns and 
can create a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 
1993).  The resource based view offers that physical, human, and organizational 
resources are an organization’s source of competitive advantage when they are valuable, 
rare, non-substitutable and inimitable (Barney, 1991).  The top management team (TMT) 
has control over all organizational resources, to one degree or another and may be the 
valuable resource that attracts acquisition attempts.  From this perspective firms will 
acquire other firms that have these valuable resources to augment their own stock to 
compete effectively in the new global marketplace, and retention of these valuable 
resources after acquisition will positively affect post-acquisition performance.  
The fact that the competing hypothesis 2b was not supported, that of the retention 
of the TMT will negatively affect post-acquisition performance, is contradictory on the 
surface to past research that utilizes Agency theory, transaction cost theory, or the theory 
of the market for corporate control.  The findings in our research do not necessarily 
provide conflicting evidence, however as the past research utilized only large 
acquisitions, utilized different measurement techniques, had different scope and focus on 
measurement, and used secondary data.  However, our research may draw into question 
the generalizability of results from acquisitions of large publicly traded acquisitions.  For 
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example Business Week (2002) suggests that acquisitions fail to generate stockholder 
value, yet includes in its analysis only those acquisitions valued at greater than $500 
million.  Although our analysis found that size was not a significant variable in regard to 
post-acquisition performance, research involving only a small percentage of acquisitions 
(e.g., that of very large acquisitions only) may be misleading.  The TMT of firms that are 
very large may have different influences and direct interests in the firm.  For example, 
large firm TMT may have large holdings (stock options, stock, etc.) but are professional 
managers that become unduly enriched through the acquisition and as professional 
managers, leave to seek other opportunities.  Also, the personality-type of a TMT of a 
very large firm may not be compatible with the TMT of the acquiring firm, or with the 
acquiring firm’s corporate culture, causing TMT departure.  Thus the acquiring firm loses 
this potential valuable intangible resource.  As such, relying upon large acquisition 
secondary data information solely may be misleading
Interestingly, pre-acquisition performance does not correlate with post-acquisition 
performance in this study, contrary to previous research (Park, 2003).  Many studies have 
evaluated stock price, earnings and other secondary data to determine pre- and post-
acquisition performance of the purchasing firm after an acquisition, but rarely do studies 
examine the performance question from the perspective of the acquired firm.  
Conclusions about pre-acquisition performance to post-acquisition performance may be 
spurious without the mediating variable of TMT retention.  In this study, pre-acquisition 
performance was positively correlated with TMT retention, and TMT retention was 
positively correlated with post-acquisition performance, but pre- did not correlate with 
post-acquisition performance.  This finding places greater emphasis upon the focus of 
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this research: the importance of the resources of the target firm, and in particular that of 
the TMT.
Since our research suggests that acquisitions perform better when the TMT is 
retained, and are considered a valuable asset in an acquisition, we tried to identify which 
theoretical characteristics of the TMT are of particular value.  The theoretical constructs 
of TMT characteristics of knowledge, dynamic capability and networks were all found to 
be positively related to post-acquisition performance (H3, H4 and H5).  Upper echelons
theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) suggests that TMT characteristics affect 
organizational outcomes.  One of the characteristics important to a TMT is the network of 
relationships in which the TMT is embedded in, both external and internal.  For example, 
the advice network that a TMT forms to acquire and share tacit knowledge throughout the 
organization is a key coordinating mechanism (Athanssiou and Nigh, 1999).  Also, the 
internal network focuses on productivity, innovation, and labor relations, while the
external network will focus on competition, customers and new product/market 
opportunities (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). These TMT’s network of relationships in 
which the firm is embedded seem to make an important contribution to firm success. As 
a lynchpin, the TMT assures an even flow of information between the parties involved
which may also assist in the post-acquisition performance of the acquisition.
According to Hambrick and Mason’s upper echelons theory (1984), the TMT 
impacts organizational outcomes with of their decisions.  These decisions are based upon 
the TMT’s personal knowledge of the organization (internal), market, and industry 
(external), intertwined with their personal experiences and expert knowledge.  Other 
TMT members, through personal contact, can only understand any TMT member’s tacit 
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knowledge over time (Winter, 1987).  As the competencies built upon a knowledge 
platform are key factors in determining an organization’s current and future value, 
retention of the TMT due to their knowledge may positively affect post acquisition 
performance (Grant, 1996; Hamel, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996; Yli-
Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001; Seth, Song and Petit, 2002; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  
The TMT has tacit knowledge in regard to strategy, organizational strengths and 
weakness, the industry, etc., which is a valuable commodity to the firm affecting 
performance of the acquired firm.
TMT dynamic capabilities inferred by the Upper Echelon perspective is the 
ability of an organization to anticipate and respond to opportunities or pressures for 
change, both internal and external (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  TMT dynamic 
capabilities utilizes TMT knowledge garnish from their internal and external networks, 
and is the conduit for strategic direction.  Past research has supported this perspective and 
have found a link between TMT and strategic innovation and performance (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989; Norburn and Birley, 1988).  How the TMT employs the firm’s assets, and 
how quickly, affects the success of a strategy in today’s global competition (Eisenhardt 
and Brown, 1998b).  The TMT’s decisions as to the direction and employment of 
strategically key resources are often what create value for firms and positively affect 
post-acquisition performance.
The fact that competitive dynamics did not moderate the relationships between 
the TMT characteristics and post-acquisition performance is theoretically and intuitively 
surprising, but is in accordance with the resource based view of the firm.  If as we have 
argued previously, that the typical acquisition is smaller with a very influential top 
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management team which has developed pre-acquisition high performance, these same 
individuals will be targeted for retention.  Their characteristics which engendered the 
firm success will be required in all different types of industries.
The inability to collect enough differing data in regard to acquisition type 
(horizontal, unrelated, and vertical) is a significant finding.  These results are similar to 
actual practitioner rates through review of the most recent 303 acquisitions which as a 
total valued over $31 billion in total from December 15, 2003 to February 11, 2004 
(Venture Reporter, 2004).  This finding itself is of scholarly interest due to the research in 
regard to the diversification literature (see for whether or not the acquisition was by a 
conglomerate firm (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Lubatkin, 1987), whether or not the acquisition was of a related firm (e.g., Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997; Lubatkin, Srinivasan, and Merchant, 1997; Walker, 2000; Wansley, 
Lane, and Yang, 1983)).  The subsequent review of these 303 acquisitions that actually 
have occurred within the last six months suggest that this is not an anomaly of the data 
set, or particular to sampling error, but mirrors current reality.  This is in accordance with
the suggestion that “These days, there’s a trend toward “focused” companies making 
closely related acquisitions, and hardly any new conglomerates are forming” (Wall Street 
Journal, 10-25-2004; p. R4).
6.2 Managerial Implications
As firms continue to use the acquisition strategy (e.g. in 2003, 27,612 mergers 
and acquisitions deals were announced), research that explores post-acquisition success 
continues to provide direction for managers.  Our research has several possible 
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implications for managers and their success in pursuing the acquisition strategy.  The 
correlation between pre-acquisition success and retention suggests that the TMT of the 
target firm has successfully implemented a strategy delivering a competitive advantage 
and above average returns.  As such, the target firm’s TMT is retained to continue their 
managerial actions in concert with the acquiring firm.  Combining the two firm’s 
resources will require coordination amongst both TMT groups.
Retention of the target firm’s TMT after acquisition to obtain higher post-
acquisition performance is a warning to the acquiring firm to attempt to retain the TMT 
of the target firm.  Pre-acquisition negotiations and due diligence between the two firms 
should be an opportunity for the acquiring firm to identify and court the target firm’s 
valuable TMT.  As such, relationship development between the members could assist in 
retaining the TMT.
In developing the coordinating mechanisms and governance structures after 
acquisition, care should be given as to not overshadow the target firm’s TMT 
characteristics.  After acquisition many purchasers may be more inclined to make 
changes and increase governance (Krug and Hegarty, 1997).  This research’s findings 
suggest that the acquired firm’s TMT characteristics of dynamic capabilities, network, 
and knowledge positively affect post-acquisition performance and therefore should be 
nurtured.  Governance mechanisms that thwart the target firm’s TMT characteristics may 
also lead to poorer post-acquisition performance.
6.3 Future Research
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This research opens the door for an extended research program.  Further research 
on the particular characteristics of the TMT that assist in positive post-acquisition 
performance can continue to be examined.  The issues surrounding what variables are 
needed to retain the TMT, whether it is pre-acquisition, or incentives post-acquisition 
could be explored.  Even more interesting is that this study suggests that the TMT 
retention positively affects post-acquisition performance, but is this necessarily always 
true?  The rare situations that retention negatively affects post-acquisition performance 
should also be investigated. The exceptions may have some explanatory power that may 
be more interesting then the rule.
Integration of the TMT and governance mechanisms employed by the acquiring 
firm in regard to the post-acquisition performance should be researched.  Transference of 
employees between the two firms, or any at all, in the integration process to understand 
post-acquisition success would also be valuable.  Initial review of other data we collected 
suggests that the greater degree of assimilation into the firm positively affects post-
acquisition performance which also contributes to the synergy literature.  Many 
purchasers may be more inclined to make changes and increase governance (Krug and 
Hegarty, 1997) and strive to create a situation where all the internal and external 
resources are joined, working together towards the mutual goals and objectives.  The 
target TMT’s participation in the buy-in, development and implementation of monitoring 
systems is essential to engender cooperation (Cartwright, 1993).  As such, the integration 
of the firm, versus allowing the related firm to “stand alone”, will positively affect post 
acquisition performance.  The retained TMT with their knowledge of their firm and 
internal networks will assist in the integration process.
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Investigating the time line of the acquisition strategy as to an ongoing process 
versus the static viewpoint of one acquisition and then performance outcomes, would 
accelerate scholar’s appreciation of strategy as a continuum and not as stationary strategic 
moves.  As strategy is an ongoing complex plan, strategic acquisitions that affect not only 
the firm as a whole, but each of its segments, would further our understanding of these 
strategic moves.  Analysis of singular acquisitions may not be effective when 
combinations of strategic acquisitions are the true source of competitive advantage.  
Initial review of other data we collected suggests that the acquisition strategy is not a 
singular action, but performed in a stream of strategic acquisitions.  Past research focuses 
on total company performance due to one acquisition.  This view may be confounding the 
acquisition research.  
Comparing the results on a data set collected in a global market where 
relationships are even more important then in the US domestic market will facilitate our 
knowledge in the international business field.  As multinational corporations ever 
increasingly grow, and doing so through acquisitions, this phenomena outside our borders 
to increase post-acquisition performance, as well as the TMT characteristics of a foreign 
born TMT will be of importance.
Review of the TMT capabilities against each of the performance measures 
separately may suggest some interesting correlations.  For example, although TMT 
networks are positively correlated to post-acquisition performance in total, they may not 
be significant to the Employee Performance measure of Post-Acquisition Performance.  
Therefore, to delve even deeper into the data we collected.  More in-depth review of the 
TMT characteristics will also need to be investigated.  Which characteristic in which 
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strategic circumstance (when, in essence) is valued greater, will also further the TMT 
literature. 
6.4 Limitations of the Research
As with any empirical study, limitations do exist. The design of our research 
discussed earlier was developed in an attempt to control error and bias and which we 
believe was effective. Yet, due to certain aspects inherent in quantitative research and 
scope/level of this analysis, some limitations exist. Some of these issues are discussed 
briefly below.
The use of perceptual data, the use of key informants, and interest/response bias 
may all be limits to this study. A Cross-sectional design is a limitation as it could be 
better to study performance over a time range rather than asking for a snapshot. Thus, the 
manager may relate performance to this week which has been exceptionally good or bad 
and thus not representative of typical firm performance. This issue may be complicated 
by the fact that most measures were perceptual and therefore depend at some level on 
individual differences and environmental influences. The complications of perceptual 
differences could be overcome through the use of multiple informants, but it was deemed 
that multiple informants would be impossible in this type of study where the nature of the 
information is very sensitive and anonymity must be maintained. Additionally, multiple 
informants have not been supported as a perfect panacea for the complications of 
perceptual differences (John and Reve 1982; and Kumar, Stern and Anderson 1993). 
Finally, interest bias is a type of response bias caused by the people who are interested 
being the only people to respond. This is a limitation, but the response rate should reduce 
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its impact. Sadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) suggest that response bias is not a huge 
issue and that if researchers focus on non-response bias, response bias should take care of 
itself.
There are sample limitations as we did not sample the entire population of all 
possible acquisitions.  Our population, from which we sampled, is only a small portion of 
total acquisitions.  Therefore, there is a possibility that the sample is not representative of 
the total population of acquisitions.  Although the size of our sample was sufficient for 
our research, in comparison to the total amount of acquisitions announced, is relatively 
small.  So both in term of size and representativeness, the sample does provide a research 
limitation.
6.5  Method Limits
In addition to the study limits, a few method based limits exist. Two specific areas 
of contention are linear vs. curvilinear estimation of fit. Some researchers suggest that 
linear relationships are not a true representation of fit (Edwards 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 
1995). Due to the nature of the study design for measuring fit, it was assumed that a 
simpler measure would be better. Thus, general linear modeling and regression analyses 
were used. Future research could examine three-dimensional components. Another 
important limitation is the measure of performance in the study was based upon 
perception instead of other options utilized by strategy researchers in the past, or 
combination thereof (ex. CAPM, stock price, net sales, etc.). 
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Table 4.1
Table of Industry Types
Reported by Respondents
Apparel 1 Energy 1 logistics 1
Automotive 2 Energy Holding co. 1 manufacturing 6
B2B e-commerce 
software 1 engineering services 2 Marketing Services 1
Bakery Manufacturer 1 Federal consulting 1 Mechanical Contractor 1
Banking 1 Fiber optics 1 Medical Software 1
Billing Software 1 Financial 1 Military Contracting 1
Biopharmaceutical 2 Financial Investments 1 Mortgage banker 1
Biotech 2 Financial Services 3 Mortgage Banking 1
Broadcasting 1 funeral 2 Office equipment distribution 1
Business Consulting 1 Gas and oil 1 Online marketplace 1
Business Services 1 government contracting 1 Outsourcing Services 1
Chemical 1
Government Contracting -
IT 1 Professional Services 1
Chemical Production 1 Government IT Services 1 Retail 3
Collection 1 Healthcare 2 Savings and Loan 1
Commercial Bank 1 Healthcare products 1 Security Services 1
Communications and 
technology 1 High Tech 1 Software 3
Communications 
solutions 1 Industrial Instruments 1 Storage software 1
Computer Sales 1 Information Technology 3
Technology-based business 
solutions 1
Computer Software 1 Insurance 1 Telecom 7
Computing Products 1 Internet 1 Telecom Consulting 1
Construction 4 Internet billing 1 Title Insurance 1
defense 2 IT Services 2 Transportation 2
Direct Broadcast Satellite 1 Lawn and Garden Products 1
Voice and data 
Communications 1



























1 -.099 -.044 -.100 .087 .064 .202(*) .186 .062 .117
Sig. (2-tailed) . .323 .660 .316 .386 .525 .042 .062 .537 .240
Size Pearson Correlation -.099 1 -.023 .175 -.100 -.165 -.125 -.026 .039 .070




-.044 -.023 1 .102 .089 -.086 -.027 -.069 -.075 -.036
Sig. (2-tailed) .660 .822 . .309 .376 .390 .789 .492 .455 .716
Ownership of 
Target firm
Pearson Correlation -.100 .175 .102 1 .076 .056 .079 .119 .195 .142





.087 -.100 .089 .076 1 .096 .403(**) .310(**) .301(**) .464(**)





.064 -.165 -.086 .056 .096 1 .589(**) .635(**) .536(**) .403(**)





.202(*) -.125 -.027 .079 .403(**) .589(**) 1 .856(**) .736(**) .659(**)




.186 -.026 -.069 .119 .310(**) .635(**) .856(**) 1 .848(**) .740(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .062 .798 .492 .232 .002 .000 .000 . .000 .000
TMT 
knowledge
Pearson Correlation .062 .039 -.075 .195 .301(**) .536(**) .736(**) .848(**) 1 .768(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .537 .695 .455 .050 .002 .000 .000 .000 . .000
Retention Pearson Correlation .117 .070 -.036 .142 .464(**) .403(**) .659(**) .740(**) .768(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .240 .483 .716 .155 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 5.2
Descriptive Statistics
102 -2.2924 1.45974 -.275 .239 1.776 .474
102 .9637 .18130 .201 .239 -.351 .474
102 2.0588 .78126 -.104 .239 -1.346 .474
102 4.9118 1.54217 -.543 .239 -.966 .474
102 1.99 .724 .653 .239 .800 .474
102 4.660131 1.425133 -.472 .239 -1.117 .474
102 4.404 1.9620 -.261 .239 -1.478 .474
102 4.38 1.687 -.206 .239 -1.327 .474
102 4.051 1.6510 -.194 .239 -1.401 .474



















Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
N Mean Std. Skewness Kurtosis
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Table 5.3: Common Method Variance
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 4.017 40.166 40.166 4.017 40.166 40.166
2 1.218 12.180 52.346 1.218 12.180 52.346
3 1.115 11.148 63.494 1.115 11.148 63.494
4 .993 9.934 73.428
5 .874 8.743 82.171
6 .721 7.207 89.378
7 .507 5.066 94.444
8 .279 2.789 97.233
9 .178 1.781 99.014
10 .099 .986 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.




size -.311 .311 .615
Competitive dynamics .200 .236 -.321
Type of purchase -.097 .630 .534
Pre-acquisition performance .465 .427 -.236
Ownership of Target firm -.025 .604 -.436
Post-acquisition performances .680 -.323 .281
Retention .847 .095 -.021
TMT knowledge .893 -.021 .064
TMT dynamic capability .895 .091 .070
TMT Network .935 .005 .120
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  3 components extracted.
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a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: WAVE
Table 5.4.2:  Non-Response Bias Analysis
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .312(a) .097 .020 .779
a  Predictors: (Constant), Wave, TMT Knowledge, Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, 
Pre-Acquisition Performance, Post-Acquisition performance, TMT Dynamic Capabilities, Retention, TMT 
Network




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n 6.087 8 .761 1.254 .277(a)
Residual 56.432 93 .607
1
Total 62.520 101
a  Predictors: (Constant),  TMT Knowledge, Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, Pre-
Acquisition Performance, Post-Acquisition performance, TMT Dynamic Capabilities, Retention, TMT 
Network
b  Dependent Variable: WAVE
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Table 5.5.1: Construct Validity of Performance 
KMO and Bartlett's Test




Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity
Sig. .000













Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 5.5.3: Construct Validity of Performance
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 6.429 64.289 64.289 6.429 64.289 64.289
2 .877 8.766 73.055
3 .673 6.735 79.790
4 .529 5.288 85.078
5 .424 4.240 89.318
6 .332 3.317 92.635
7 .243 2.433 95.068
8 .192 1.922 96.991
9 .188 1.876 98.866
10 .113 1.134 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.








Items N of Items
.938 .938 10
Table 5.6.1: Construct Validity of TMT Retention
KMO and Bartlett's Test




Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity
Sig. .000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Table 5.6.3: Construct Validity of TMT Retention
Total Variance Explained










1 3.636 90.909 90.909 3.636 90.909 90.909
2 .188 4.698 95.606
3 .097 2.425 98.031
4 .079 1.969 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.








Items N of Items
.966 .967 4
Table 5.7.1: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Dynamic Capability
KMO and Bartlett's Test















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 5.7.3: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Dynamic Capability
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 3.320 83.000 83.000 3.320 83.000 83.000
2 .368 9.195 92.195
3 .165 4.121 96.315
4 .147 3.685 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.








Items N of Items
.931 .931 4
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Table 5.8.1: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Network
KMO and Bartlett's Test




Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity
Sig. .000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 5.8.3: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Network
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 3.308 82.688 82.688 3.308 82.688 82.688
2 .292 7.305 89.993
3 .259 6.479 96.473
4 .141 3.527 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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Table 5.8.5: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Network
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items
.929 4
Table 5.9.1: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Knowledge
KMO and Bartlett's Test




Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity
Sig. .000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 5.9.3: Construct Validity of TMT Characteristic: Knowledge
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2.924 73.104 73.104 2.924 73.104 73.104
2 .660 16.497 89.600
3 .276 6.903 96.503
4 .140 3.497 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.








Items N of Items
.873 .873 4
Table 5.10.1: Construct Validity of Pre-Acquisition Performance
KMO and Bartlett's Test




Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity
Sig. .000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Table 5.10.3: Construct Validity of Pre-Acquisition Performance
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 3.138 78.440 78.440 3.138 78.440 78.440
2 .425 10.616 89.056
3 .265 6.619 95.675
4 .173 4.325 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.








Items N of Items
.908 .908 4
Table 5.11





1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 Pre-Acquisition Performance(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: TMT Retention
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Table 5.11.1




















1 .084(a) .007 -.023 1.9847 .007 .234 3 98 .873
2 .487(b) .237 .205 1.7490 .230 29.194 1 97 .000
a  Predictors: (Constant),Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant),Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, Pre-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.11.2




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 2.760 3 .920 .234 .873(a)
Residual 386.028 98 3.939
Total 388.788 101
2 Regression 92.065 4 23.016 7.524 .000(b)
Residual 296.723 97 3.059
Total 388.788 101
a  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, Pre-Acquisition Performance
c  Dependent Variable: TMT Retention
Table 5.11.3








B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 4.629 .647 7.151 .000
size .151 .216 .071 .701 .485
ownership of Target 
Firm
-.084 .273 -.031 -.307 .760
Type of Purchase -.045 .138 -.033 -.327 .744
2 (Constant) 1.893 .763 2.482 .015
size .254 .191 .119 1.329 .187
ownership of Target 
Firm -.125 .241 -.046 -.521 .604
Type of Purchase -.101 .122 -.074 -.828 .410
Pre-Acquisition 
Performance .615 .114 .484 5.403 .000
a  Dependent Variable: TMT Retention
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Table 5.12





1 ownership of Target Firm,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT Retention(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.12.1































.167 20.855 1 97 .000
a  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Retention
Table 5.12.2




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
11.995 3 3.998 2.029 .115(a)




n 46.172 4 11.543 7.044 .000(b)
Residual 158.960 97 1.639
2
Total 205.131 101
a  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Retention
c  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.12.3










B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 5.520 .458 12.054 .000
size -.251 .152 -.162 -1.647 .103
ownership of 
Target Firm -.299 .193 -.152 -1.549 .125
ownership of 
Target Firm -.080 .097 -.080 -.819 .415
2 (Constant) 4.142 .515 8.042 .000
size -.296 .139 -.191 -2.124 .036
ownership of 
Target Firm -.275 .176 -.140 -1.556 .123
ownership of 
Target Firm -.066 .089 -.067 -.746 .457
TMT Retention .298 .065 .410 4.567 .000
a  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.13





1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT network(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.13.1































.391 68.930 1 97 .000
a  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT network
Table 5.13.2




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
11.995 3 3.998 2.029 .115(a)




n 92.227 4 23.057 19.809 .000(b)
Residual 112.904 97 1.164
2
Total 205.131 101
a  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT network
c  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.13.3










1 (Constant) 5.520 .458 12.054 .000
size -.251 .152 -.162 -1.647 .103
ownership of 
Target Firm -.299 .193 -.152 -1.549 .125
Type of Purchase -.080 .097 -.080 -.819 .415
2 (Constant) 3.206 .449 7.143 .000
size -.225 .117 -.145 -1.917 .058
ownership of 
Target Firm -.294 .149 -.149 -1.976 .051
Type of Purchase -.037 .075 -.037 -.489 .626
TMT network .541 .065 .627 8.302 .000
a  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.14





1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT  knowledge(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.14.1































.293 43.730 1 97 .000
a  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT  knowledge
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Table 5.14.2




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 11.995 3 3.998 2.029 .115(a)
Residual 193.136 98 1.971
Total 205.131 101
2 Regression 72.010 4 18.003 13.118 .000(b)
Residual 133.121 97 1.372
Total 205.131 101
a  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT  knowledge
c  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.14.3










1 (Constant) 5.520 .458 12.054 .000
size -.251 .152 -.162 -1.647 .103
ownership of Target 
Firm -.299 .193 -.152 -1.549 .125
Type of Purchase -.080 .097 -.080 -.819 .415
2 (Constant) 3.467 .492 7.042 .000
size -.282 .127 -.182 -2.216 .029
ownership of Target 
Firm
-.319 .161 -.162 -1.977 .051
Type of Purchase -.039 .082 -.040 -.482 .631
TMT  knowledge .459 .069 .543 6.613 .000
a  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.15





1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT dynamic Capability (a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.15.1































.330 52.378 1 97 .000
a  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), ,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT dynamic Capability
Table 5.15.2




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n 11.995 3 3.998 2.029 .115(a)




n 79.717 4 19.929 15.414 .000(b)
Residual 125.415 97 1.293
2
Total 205.131 101
a  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant),,Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT dynamic Capability
c  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.15.3










B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 5.520 .458 12.054 .000
size -.251 .152 -.162 -1.647 .103
ownership of 
Target Firm -.299 .193 -.152 -1.549 .125
Type of Purchase -.080 .097 -.080 -.819 .415
2 (Constant) 3.394 .473 7.175 .000
size -.137 .124 -.088 -1.100 .274
ownership of 
Target Firm -.331 .157 -.168 -2.111 .037
Type of Purchase -.062 .079 -.062 -.782 .436
TMT dynamic 
Capability .540 .075 .580 7.237 .000
a  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.16








1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT Knowledge(a) . Enter
3 Competitive Environment, Competitive Environment/TMT Knowledge 
Interaction(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.16.1






























.019 1.401 2 95 .251
a  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Knowledge
c  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Knowledge, Competitive 
Environment, Competitive Environment/TMT Knowledge Interaction
Table 5.16.2









B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 5.520 .458 12.054 .000
size -.251 .152 -.162 -1.647 .103
ownership of 
Target Firm -.299 .193 -.152 -1.549 .125
Type of 
Purchase -.080 .097 -.080 -.819 .415
2 (Constant) 3.467 .492 7.042 .000
size -.282 .127 -.182 -2.216 .029
ownership of 
Target Firm -.319 .161 -.162 -1.977 .051
Type of 
Purchase -.039 .082 -.040 -.482 .631
TMT 
Knowledge .459 .069 .543 6.613 .000
a  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
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Table 5.17






1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT Dynamic Capability(a) . Enter
3 Competitive Environment, Competitive Environment/TMT 
Dynamic Capability Interaction(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.17.1




















1 .242(a) .058 .030 1.4038444
71920657
.058 2.029 3 98 .115
2 .623(b) .389 .363 1.1370740
11868860
.330 52.378 1 97 .000
3 .627(c) .393 .355 1.144899926852251 .004 .339 2 95 .713
Model Summary
a  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Dynamic Capability
c  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Dynamic Capability, 
Competitive Environment, Competitive Environment/TMT Dynamic Capability Interaction
166
Table 5.18






1 Type of Purchase,
 size, 
ownership of Target Firm(a)
. Enter
2 TMT Network(a) . Enter
3 Competitive Environment, Competitive 
Environment/TMT Network Interaction(a) . Enter
a  All requested variables entered.
b  Dependent Variable: Post-Acquisition Performance
Table 5.18.1



















1 .242(a) .058 .030 1.4038444
71920657
.058 2.029 3 98 .115
2 .671(b) .450 .427 1.0788701
03477744
.391 68.930 1 97 .000
3 .675(c) .456 .422 1.083558331378661 .007 .581 2 95 .561
a  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm
b  Predictors: (Constant), Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Network
c  Predictors: (Constant),Type of Purchase, size, ownership of Target Firm, TMT Network, Competitive 
Environment, Competitive Environment/TMT Network Interaction
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Appendix A
The Questionnaire (Acquisitions with Good Performance)
Think of one recent acquisition in which you have participated and for which you can determine the post-
acquisition performance and the performance was good.  By recent, we mean an acquisition that occurred 
within the last one - two (1-2) years. When asked about the top management team (TMT) of the acquired 
firm, we mean those individuals from as little as three to ten people who are at the apex of the acquired 
organization and providing strategic leadership.
About the Acquisition and Your Firm
1. In what industry was the acquisition made? (ex. retail, steel, biotech, transportation, etc.) 
______________________________
2.  In what industry is your firm? (ex. retail, steel, biotech, transportation, etc.)
______________________________
3. Approximately how large is your firm (i.e., the acquiring firm) in gross revenues? 
_____________________
4. Approximately how large was the Acquisition in gross revenues? _______________
5. In the past 10 years, approximately how many acquisitions has your firm made? ________
6. Which of the following best describes the ownership structure of the Acquisition, prior to Purchase?
(Please check only one)
Division or operating unit of another firm, ________
Privately owned _______
Independent public firm with a few significant stock holders______
Independent public firm with dispersed ownership________
7. Please indicate on the scale below how your firm managed the Acquisition after acquisition.
Fully Integrated Not at all 
into our firm and can not be integrated and is
recognized as a stand- a stand-alone 
alone entity entity
         1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
8. Please indicate how your firm paid for the acquisition:
All cash _________ 
All Stock _________ 
All debt _________ 
Combination _________ 






Type of Acquisition How would you classify the acquisition according to the following four 
categories (choose one) 
1) A horizontal acquisition, two organizations in the same industry (competitors) or combination 
between organizations offering complimentary products of service (ex.    a wireless service 
firm acquired by a local and long distance services firm)________
2) The acquisition of an unrelated organization.  Not in our industry.__________
3) A forward vertical acquisition, one organization is acquiring another within their supply 
chain.  For example, a manufacturer purchasing an organization forward in their supply chain 
like a distributor._____________
4) A backward vertical acquisition, one organization is acquiring another within their supply 
chain.  For example, a manufacturer purchasing an organization backward in their chain like a 
supplier._____________




The target firm was selling similar products/services. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The target firm competed directly with our main line of 
business.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The target firm was an important supplier.. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The target firm was an important customer. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The products the target firm supplies were critical to our 
business.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The products we supplied to the target firm were critical to 
its business.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7








Before acquisition, the organization was one of the better 
firms in their industry.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Before acquisition, the organization was underperforming in 
comparison to their competitors.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Before acquisition, in comparison to their competitors, the 
firm had better performance.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Before acquisition, the organization was one of the poorer 
performing firms in its sector of the market.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements in regard to the 
Acquisition’s Current Performance.




The employees of the acquired organization are 
good workers.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquisition has met the strategic goals we set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Acquisition’s net profit is smaller than anticipated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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The price we paid for the acquisition was valued too high 
relative to the benefits received.    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquisition will meet expected strategic goals.          1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Most of the acquired firm’s employees do not meet 
our standards.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Acquired Firm fits into our overall strategy        1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Our organization is pleased with the talent of the acquired 
organization’s employees.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The valuation of the acquisition represented its true 
worth.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The financial performance of the acquired firm is much 
less than anticipated.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements 
regarding top management team (TMT) Retention after acquisition.
Top Management Team (TMT) 
Retention
Strongly 
Disagree       Neutral
 Strongly               
Agree 
We retained the most valuable members of the TMT of 
the acquired organization.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The TMT stayed generally intact after acquisition. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Most of the TMT members of the acquisition remained 
with our organization after purchase.




Currently, what percentage of the TMT of the acquisition 
is still with your firm?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding 
the characteristics of the top management team (TMT) of the Acquisition.
Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements 
regarding the Time Line of this Acquisition
LAST SECTION: Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following 
statements in regard to the integration of the acquisition’s top management team (TMT) into your 
firm.
The Acquisition’s Top Management 





The TMT of the acquired organization is skillful at 
adapting the firm’s assets to market conditions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquired firm’s TMT’s network of relationships is 
extensive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquired firm’s TMT’s knowledge of the acquired 
firm is valuable to our firm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The TMT members of the acquired organization are 
skillful in developing internal resources as new 
circumstances present themselves.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquired firm’s TMT’s network of external 
relationships is valuable to our firm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquired firm’s TMT’s knowledge of the industry is 
valuable to our firm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The TMT of the acquired organization develops flexible 
strategies as new needs present themselves
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquired firm’s TMT’s network of internal 
relationships is valuable to our firm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We did not think the acquired firm’s TMT’s knowledge 
of their industry was important.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The TMT of the acquired organization reconfigure 
acquired firm internal capabilities skillfully in order to 
meet changing market conditions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The acquired firm’s TMT is skillful at developing new 
internal relationships as needed.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We had sufficient knowledge in-house to run the 
acquired organization.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Acquisition Time Line Strongly 
Disagree       Neutral
 Strongly               
Agree 
This acquisition was done to meet short terms objectives. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This acquisition is one of a stream of strategic 
acquisitions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This acquisition is part of a long-term strategy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Performance of the total firm changed quickly due to this 
acquisition.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We anticipate results from this acquisition to not accrue 
until years later.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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The TMT decisions of the acquired firm typically meet 
with our approval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In dealing with the TMT of the acquired organization, we 
have a mutual understanding of each of our roles
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In dealing with the TMT of the acquired organization, we 
have a mutual understanding concerning remedies for 
performance failure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We implemented similar management information systems 
in the acquired firm as used by our other divisions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We have a mutual understanding of how the TMT of the 
acquired organization will act in case of a major, 
unanticipated event.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We spend too much time in monitoring the acquisition’s 
actions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
During negotiations we developed a relationship with the 
TMT of the acquired organization.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The TMT team of the acquisition requires extensive 
supervision.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OPTIONAL: (Completion of any or all items of this section is not required.)
What is the name of your firm?_______________________________________
What is the name of the firm you purchased? ____________________________
